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Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in
Public Family Law: The Importance of Private
Providers in the Dependency System
SUSAN VIVIAN MANGOLDt

The legal framework underpinning family law
traditionally balances the rights of parents, the needs and
rights of children, and the authority and obligations of the
state. This triangular framework was built in a series of
Supreme Court cases challenging state regulation of the
family. I coin the phrase public family law to depict cases
where the state has intervened into the "private" family to
assume some custodial interest from the parents. I argue
that in public family law, the triangular, constitutional
framework is inadequate to explain the complexity of rights
and duties exchanged.
Beyond the three-party structure of the constitutional
framework, a body of law has developed which articulates
rights of other potential rights holders in the dependency
system, such as grandparents and foster parents. This
paper traces the role of one of those potential rights holders,
the nonprofit private provider agency. It argues that
because they provide a variety of services to children and
their families, and because they have responsibilities vis-vis children, parents, and the state, private agencies should
have corresponding rights. Full recognition of the role of
private provider agencies and others who have vital
relationships with the child and family suggests an
alternative framework that recognizes the historic and
current roles of private providers and other rights holders.
tAssociate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. I wish to
thank Robert Berger, Emily Buss, Alfred Konefsky, Isabel Marcus, Peter
Pitegoff, Robert Schwartz, Robert Steinfeld, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Kimberly Forte
and Mia McFarlane, 1998 State University of New York at Buffalo School of
Law Fellows in Family Law, and to Sheila Dickinson and Carolyn Goodwin,
1999 State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law Fellows in Family
Law, for their outstanding research assistance.
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Instead of a myopic focus on a triangle of rights, the model

should be a more expansive set of concentric circles. The
child is in the center surrounded by the small circle of the
child's family. Beyond that circle is a concentric circle of
supporters from the community, including private
providers, who have an important relationship with the

child.
The parent-child-state constitutional framework was
developed in a series of Supreme Court cases that defined
when the state could intervene constitutionally in the
family. Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
Prince v. Massachusetts, and later Wisconsin v. Yoder are

considered landmark cases establishing the parameters of
state

intervention

through

a balance

of rights

and

responsibilities among parents, children, and the state.! In

1. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse traces the social and legal context of the
constitutional framework of parent-child-state but also challenges the
framework itself. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 'Who Owns the Child?':
Meyer, Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 995, 1051
(1992). She argues for a more duty-oriented recognition of rights and
responsibilities and deconstructs present notions of nuclear family and parental
responsibility, exposing the limits of the present framework in recognizing the
reality of children's lives and needs. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching
the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOzO L. REV.
1747 (1993); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 'It All Depends on What You Mean
by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional"Family,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 569 (1996). Hillary Rodham hinted at such an inclusive
model in her article Children Under the Law. Hillary Rodham, Children Under
the Law, in THE RIGHTS OF CHLDREN 1 (1974). In that piece, she suggested that
issues of child placement and review of those placements should be determined
by boards made up of persons from the child's community. The boards would
include professional workers such as would be employed by provider agencies.
At the outset, she adopts the accepted triangle. "These issues of family
autonomy and privacy, state responsibility and children's independence are
complex, but they determine how children are treated by the nation's
legislatures, courts and administrative agencies." Id. However, at the
conclusion of her article, she challenges the closed triangle. "Without an
increase in community involvement, the best drafted laws and most eloquent
judicial opinions will merely recycle past disappointments." Id. at 28.
2. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This parent-child-state framework has been
adopted by the major commentators on family law. See CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE (Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg eds., 3d ed. 1995) (assuming,
through title and organization, that the parent-child-state balance is the
organizing framework); Robert H. Mnookin, Final Observations, in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHLDREN 511 (Robert H. Mnookin, ed., 1985) ("At the most basic
level, the question 'Who decides?' concerns the allocation of power and
responsibility among child, family and state."); SAMU L M. DAviS, ET AL.,
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particular, this paper challenges that three-party
framework as it applies to the dependency system, the
social services, and legal system that authorizes and
provides for state intervention in the family based on
allegations of child abuse and neglect.' Two more recent
cases, Wilder v. Bernstein and Smith v. Organization of
FosterFamiliesfor Equity and Reform ("O.F.F.E.R.94 focus
on some of the important actors in addition to the parent,

child, and

state in the dependency

system. These

"important others," including foster parents and private
provider agencies, are discussed in these cases but the

parent-child-state doctrinal structure is not explicitly
(2d ed. 1997) ("How should decision making
authority be allocated between child and parent, and equally important, how
should that same power be allocated between parent and state? Essentially, the
question is 'Who decides what is best for a child?'). In Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965), Justice White, in concurrence, suggests that the
constitutional protection so carefully crafted by the majority and concurrences.
in the case is obvious.
It would be unduly repetitious, and belaboring the obvious, to expound
on the impact of the statute [criminalizing contraception] on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary or
capricious denials or on the nature of this liberty. Suffice it to say that
this is not the first time this Court has had occasion to articulate that
the liberty entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children,'
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, and 'the liberty... to direct the
upbringing and education of children,' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 .... "
3. This paper will use the term "dependency system" to describe the whole
range of social and legal services provided to children at risk of abuse and
neglect at the hands of their caretakers. The dependency system is a component
of the more comprehensive child welfare system, which includes childcare,
health, and nutrition and other publicly funded programs in addition to those
targeted to abused and neglected children. The "system" is characterized by
paralyzing crisis and lack of coordination. In 1991, the National Commission on
Children appointed by then President Bush stated in its report, "If the nation
had deliberately designed a system that would frustrate the professionals who
staff it, anger the public who finance it, and abandon the children who depend
on it, it could not have done a better job than the present child welfare system."
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RRETOlmc: A NEW AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATL COMMN ON CHILDREN

(1991). The term "child protection" will be used in this paper to describe only
the front end of the dependency system-reporting, investigating, and record
keeping of allegations of abuse and neglect.
4. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting challenge to
settlement of the case). Earlier aspects of the case and subsequent litigation
regarding fees are discussed infra. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equity and Reform ("O.F.F.E.R."), 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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challenged. A review of these cases, along with the history
of the dependency system and the current operation of the
system, reveal the closed parent-child-state triangle as an
incomplete model for the complexity of family law,
especially as it applies to abused and neglected children in
the dependency system.
The argument for inclusion of private agencies as
stakeholders with an important, recognized role in
dependency proceedings is ultimately based on the
assessment that such inclusion promotes the protectionbased best interest of children. Considering all of the
implications of this more inclusive framework is beyond the
scope of this article, but it does discuss one possible
implication, the effect of an enhanced role for private
providers on the representation of children.
Part I challenges the accepted theoretical and doctrinal
frameworks of family law by reviewing the Supreme Court
cases that established the parent-child-state triangular
balance of rights. To these jurisprudentially fundamental
family law cases are added Smith v. O.F.F.E.R. and Wilder
v. Bernstein. These cases challenge the tripartite
framework with their exhaustive reviews of the importance
of private providers in the dependency system, and expose
the limits of the parent-child-state triangle. The tripartite
model is incomplete in assessing the true rights and
responsibilities borne by participants in the dependency
system.
Part II traces the historical development of the legal
response to child abuse and neglect, focusing on cases and
laws that defined the appropriate roles of the parent, child,
and state, and the emergence of private agency
participation. Formative codes in colonial America,
indenture on behalf of categories of children considered
needy, and the emergence of private provider agencies in
the late nineteenth century, all predate the development of
public child welfare agencies. The ongoing presence of
active, intervening individuals and entities challenges the
parent-child-state framework from the earliest days of
American law. Part Two continues the historical analysis
by exploring the emergence of private agencies as key
actors in the early twentieth century. It then turns to the
federal-state statutory scheme developed in the second half
of the twentieth century. This scheme formally embraced
the old parent-child-state model but it continued to rely on
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private provider agencies.
Part III looks at the current dependency system,
focusing on the role of private agencies and on current state
laws that allow participation by private agencies in
dependency proceedings. Dependency proceedings are
considered broadly, from initial child protection hearings
through termination of parental rights and adoption
hearings, in order to appreciate the scope of private agency
participation. The extent of the participation and its
influence on the courts will be considered through an
analysis of the statutes and case law that invite an active
role for private agencies.
Part IV applies the expanded framework by considering
the impact of private provider participation in court
proceedings. Although the focus of this paper is on the
historical and current status of private providers and the
inadequacy of the parent-child-state framework because it
does not consider that status, the expanded theory is
applied to the arguments concerning representational
models for children. In particular, the model of
representation of children is examined when private
provider agencies have an active status in hearings.
Through that discussion, this article enters the debate
between those concerned with the proper representational
model for children's attorneys. Lawyers should represent
the children as competent clients whenever possible and not
resort to a paternalistic model of representation whereby
the attorney determines the "best" position to take whether
or not it is the position the child wishes.6 The undue
influence of children's attorneys or the incomplete evidence
of safety risks diminishes when the role of private providers
is factored into the court proceedings. Including
knowledgeable private provider agency representatives in
hearings will make it safer and therefore easier for the
children's attorneys to assume the traditional attorney role.
5. Courts have repeatedly commented on the complexity and chaos of the
dependency system with its many subcontracting private provider agencies.
"Even with the best of intentions, the complex foster care system, comprised of
state regulatory boards, local DSS offices and myriad private contracting
agencies (roughly 80 in New York City) has been shown to fail thousands of
children and families." In re Jonathan D., 412 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 738 (1978).
6. See generally, Proceedingsof the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children:Recommendations of the Conference, 64 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 1301 (1996).

1402

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

There are criticisms about the increased participation of
private agencies in the dependency system. Historically,
cultural bias has been a constant concern. In the current
system, that bias remains ever present. Private provider
agencies have evolved from their paternalistic predecessors,
but they are still institutional actors, often funded and
staffed from outside the community where they work. The
article attempts an honest portrayal of the agencies,
including ongoing cultural bias, and determines that, on
balance, their increased visible participation is a positive
reform, especially when it is made accountable by
participation in dependency hearings.
A second criticism of enhancing the legal role of private
provider agencies is that the already complex, chaotic
dependency system should not be "fixed" by adding to it
another party that brings along attorneys, agendas, and
interests separate from those of the children. Again, the
article determines that the extensive involvement of private
providers is already part of the system. Giving them a voice
in legal proceedings will provide more direct access to
information and services that can better serve children and
their families.
1 After considering the theoretical, doctrinal, historical,
and pragmatic arguments, this paper argues that the
limited triangle should be exchanged for a more expansive
circle of care for children. Relatives, public agencies, foster
parents, private agencies, teachers, and schools may all be
part of this community circle. This paper focuses on private
providers, who are vital historical and contemporary
stakeholders in the dependency system, and argues for both
an expanded framework for public family law and an
expanded legal role for stakeholders in the dependency
system.
I. THE PARENT-CHILD-STATE TRIANGLE
A. Cases Developing the Parent-Child-StateTriangle
In the first half of the twentieth century, three Supreme
7. The author thanks Paul Colomy, a constructive commentator on an
earlier draft of this paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and
Society Association (June 1998) for raising this issue.
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Court cases dealt with the rights of parents or legal
guardians to exercise authority and control over the
upbringing of their children in the face of state laws
limiting that authority. These cases have long been
considered key to understanding family law, establishing a
tripartite balance of rights and responsibilities among the
parent, child, and state.' However, the parent-child-state
balance of rights fails to account for the other rights holders
driving and deciding these cases. Among these additional
rights holders are private provider agencies, such as the
Society of Sisters, named plaintiff in the second of these
cases.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has developed the
complicated history of the first two foundational family law
cases, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to
dispel the accepted understanding of these cases as liberal
icons that protect the rights of parents against the
overreaching regulation of the state into the private
family.0 Instead, she asserts that these cases can also be
understood as protecting the patriarchal notion of family
long embedded in American family law. Martha Minow also
questions the accepted wisdom of these cases as beginning a
long, consistent line of family law cases developing the
parent-child-state balance of constitutional rights.' She
views this conventional understanding of these cases and
their penumbra as ignoring the complicated debates raging
within the families and groups that brought the litigation.
Parsing out the rights of parents, children, and the state as
autonomous and individual rights holders obscures the
relational rights inherent between and among these
parties.
By questioning the parent-child-state framework
assumed in these cases, I build on the work of both
Woodhouse and Minow. The accepted doctrinal approach is
impoverished because it ignores the complexity of family
law inherent in the cases and, later, in their application.
The parent-child-state triangle of rights is only part of the
story. While Woodhouse points to alternative motivating
factors behind the judicial decisions and Minow discusses
8. See supranote 2.
9. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10. See Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child," supranote 1.
11. See Martha Minow, We the Family: ConstitutionalRights and American
Families,74 J. AMER. HIST. 959 (Dec. 1987).
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the limits of the framework, there are other parties
exercising vital duties explicitly discussed by the court but
somehow lost in the constitutional theory of family that
only considers the parent, child, and state.
Private provider agencies were a strong force behind
these cases and remain a strong if seldom acknowledged
force in family law throughout its history to the present
time. 2 Their rights were explicitly recognized by the Court
in Pierce, but never fully developed or explored. They are
not merely subcontractors whose rights are properly
assumed under the rights and responsibilities of the state.
Instead, they are important stakeholders in the dependency
system; fulfilling parent and child needs that go beyond
mere contract obligations owed to the state.
In Meyer, the Court overturned the conviction of a
parochial school teacher who violated a state law requiring
the teaching of all subjects in the English language until
the eighth grade. The Meyer Court discussed the liberty
interest infringed upon by the statute as, in part, the right
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children." 4 The
Court continued: "[C]orresponding to the right of control, it
is the natural duty of the parent to give his child education
suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states,
including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory
law." 5 The rights implicated included both the teacher's
right "to teach and the right of the parent to engage him so
to instruct their [sic] child." 6 The Court also recognized that
the state's rights and duties, "to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally, morally is clear but the
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected." 7 The Court employed a description of Plato's
Ideal Commonwealth where "the wives of our guardians are
to be common, and their children are to be common, and no
parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent." 8
The Court cited extreme state control to assert that some
limit of state power must be assumed, "and it hardly will be
affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part III B.
See Pierce, 286 U.S. at 536.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 401-02.
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upon the people of a State without doing violence to both
letter and spirit of the Constitution." 9
Two years later in Pierce, the Court further developed
the jurisprudence of state intervention into the parent-child
relationship. In Pierce, a state law that required children to
attend public school was deemed unconstitutional." Pierce
was not brought by parents challenging the law in an effort
to stop the state from requiring them to send their children
to public school. Instead, the suit was filed by the Society of
Sisters.
[The Society is] an Oregon Corporation, organized in 1880, with
power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth,
establish and maintain academies or schools, and acquire
necessary real and personal property. It has long devoted its
property and effort to the secular and religious education and care
of children, and has acquired the valuable good will of many
parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and
high schools and junior colleges, and maintains orphanages for the

custody and control of children between eight and sixteen.

In the parlance of today, the Society of Sisters would be
called a private provider agency. The Court went on to
describe the duties performed by this private provider as "a
kind of undertaking not inherently harmful, but long
regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is
nothing in the present records to indicate that they have
failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or
the State."22
The Pierce Court recognized the rights of parents and
their duty to their children and the state.
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 [mandating that children attend
public schools] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control ....The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for

19. Id. at 402.
20. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
21. Id. at 531-32.
22. Id. at 534.
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additional obligations. 2

This oft-quoted phrase recognizes an exchange of rights
and duties between parents and the state on behalf of
children. The parent-child-state triangular balance is
introduced constitutionally. This doctrinal framework is
accepted as the constitutional contribution of the Court in
Pierce, but it ignores the importance of the rights and
duties of the provider agency, the Society of Sisters, that
were so integral to the Pierce decision.
The Court in Prince built on the foundation laid by
Meyer and Pierce by further articulating the parent-childstate framework. The Prince Court held valid a state child
labor law against a legal guardian's assertion that the law
violated her right to raise the child as she saw fit, and the
child's right to practice Jehovah Witness beliefs by selling
religious magazines.' The Court limited the holdings of
Meyer and Pierce to an exchange of rights and duties among
parents, children and the state:
Previously, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, this Court
had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with
secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the
state's requirement of attendance at public schools. And in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, children's rights to receive teaching in
languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded
against the state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these
decisions have respected the private realm of family life that the
state cannot enter .... It is sufficient to show what indeed
appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare .... 25

The Prince Court focused on the limits of state and
parental control over children, thereby obscuring the
23. Id. at 534-35.
24. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (appellant is caretaking
aunt). The three cases building the parent-state-child framework of rights and
responsibilities are all brought by "others." See id; see also Meyer v. Nebraska,
268 U.S. 390, 391 (1923) (stating plaintiff is teacher); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 511
(stating plaintiff is private provider agency).
25. Prince,321 U.S. at 166-67.
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holding in the earlier cases, that included rights and duties
of other rights holders, namely teachers, schools, and
private providers. By relying on a narrow, three-party
holding in Meyer and Pierce, the Prince Court established
the parent-child-state framework for considering liberty
rights and concurrent duties.
The 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder 6 posed similar
constitutional issues, this time in the context of a successful
challenge to compulsory education laws imposed on the
Amish. In this case, parents had been convicted under a
Wisconsin law requiring attendance at school until the age
of sixteen. The parents argued that sending their teens to
school past the eighth grade violated their Amish beliefs
and lifestyle. The Court agreed with the parents, and relied
upon the parent-child-state balance established in Meyer,
Pierce,and Prince.The Court stated in relevant part:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See,
e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). Providing
public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet
even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to
the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a
privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's
statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to
age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in
directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education
in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of
parental direction of the religious formative
years have a high
27
place in our society. (citation omitted)

The Court quoted and relied upon Meyer, Pierce, and
Prince extensively in a decision that worked within a
balance of rights and responsibilities between parents and
the state to further develop the triangular doctrinal
framework.'
Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parens
26. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27. Id. at 213-14.
28. The rights of children were not considered explicitly by the majority but
they were raised by Justice Douglas in his dissent. The framework developed
was a triangle of rights and duties on behalf of, but not owed to or by the child.
See id. at 241 (Douglas, J. dissenting and arguing for a remand to consider the
wishes of the children whose parents were convicted under the law).
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patriae, to "save" a child from himself or his Amish parents by
requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school
education, the State will in large measure influence, if not
determine, the religious future of the child. Even more markedly
than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide
the religious future and education of their children ....If not the
first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this
area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court
observed: "Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control .... The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
To be
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations ....

sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that
of the child,
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety
29
or have a potential for significant social burdens."

In Santosky v. Kramer0 and then in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,3 ' parental

rights and duties and state rights and duties toward

children in the dependency system were addressed by the
Supreme Court, and the parent-child-state framework was
imposed on public family law. In Santosky, the Court held

that the standard necessary to involuntarily terminate
32

parental rights was "clear and convincing evidence." Even
when children were in the dependency system and their
care was subject to procedural safeguards at each juncture,
the importance of the parental right to the care and control
of their child could not be severed absent a showing by the
state of clear and convincing evidence of unfitness! The
Santosky Court again relied on a line of cases, beginning
with Meyer, Pierce, and Prince to demonstrate historical
recognition of parental rights.
[Fireedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 232-34.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
489 U.S. 89 (1989).
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
See id.
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in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relations are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
those resisting state intervention into ongoing family matters. 4

In DeShaney, the court declined to find a state duty to
protect a child who was in the custody of his father, not in
state custody, when the child suffered permanent serious
injury at the hands of his father. 5 Winnebago County
Department of Social Services was repeatedly informed of
incidents of abuse and the risk of further abuse, but the
agency did not remove the young child from his father's
care." The Court reasoned that the state right to intervene,
to investigate and monitor the situation, did not implicate a
duty to protect the child who remained in his father's care.31
In accordance with the parent-child-state framework
developed in the Meyer- Pierce- Prince line, the state had
not taken on the custodial right and therefore did not hold
the accompanying duty to protect the child. The right of
control had been left to the father, and the child could not
make out a liberty claim for denial of a duty to protect
based on the father's acts of private violence.
These Supreme Court decisions determined the wide
parameters of the parent-child-state relationship. Although
the interests of additional parties were present in several
cases-the teacher and schools in Meyer, the private
provider Society of Sisters in Pierce, the caretaking aunt in
Prince-the cases stand for a line of family law cases
developing a framework for analyzing parent, child, and
state rights and responsibilities in the face of state
intervention. Even though the parties were intimately
involved in the cases and in the lives of the children
affected by the challenged laws, the decisions are accepted
as precedents for a family law jurisprudence which operates
34. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
35. For a provocative discussion of the thirteenth amendment as the more
appropriate cause of action in this case, see Akbil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
36. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
37. See id. at 197.
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as if only parents, children, and the state were involved in
the cases or hold rights and duties in the lives of children.
B. Cases Developing the Role of PrivateAgencies
Two cases conceptualize the complexity of the
dependency system by depicting the prevalent, often
independent role of private provider agencies and, thereby,
challenging the traditional parent-child-state framework.
In both Wilder v. Bernstein" and Smith v. O.F.F.E.R.,39 the
court considered various aspects of the role of grivate
agencies in the system. In Wilder v. Sugarman, later
Wilder v. Bernstein, the newly formed American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") Children's Rights Project brought
its first suit to challenge the relationship between New
York City and religiously affiliated foster care agencies.
The many opinions in the years of the Wilder litigation
portray a picture in which the private provider is
41 sometimes its
the public agency,
the same42asand
sometimes
43 The
sometimes its adversary.
more able colleague,
ACLU maintained that the predominantly Catholic and
38. 848 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1988).
39. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
40. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
41. Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Plainly,
an agency's decisions relating to the acceptance and care of a child placed with
the agency by SSC, where the State and City remain ultimately responsible for
the child's welfare, and where the agency's decisions are directly circumscribed
by state and/or city regulations, contain a 'sufficiently close nexus [with] the
State ... so that the action of the [agency] may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself') (citations omitted).
42. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d at 1341 (stating that "New York City has
the option of caring for these children in its own facilities or contracting with
private agencies. In pursuance of a long tradition, it has elected to rely heavily
on private agencies. At present, more than 90% of the children are placed
through private agencies. The city contracts with some sixty private agencies.
About ninety percent of the per diem expenses of the children are paid to the
agencies from federal, state and city funds.").
43. In 1992, nineteen private provider agency intervenors were awarded
attorneys' fees from the city. They intervened to challenge the settlement
agreed to by the city. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1198 (2d Cir.
1992). In 1989, when considering the fees in the lower court, the court stated,
"[Tihe intervenors consistently and forcefully articulated objections addressed
to the constitutional and civil rights issues in this litigation. Their efforts
helped to vindicate the civil rights of the children and families in the foster care
system which they served, not just their own self interests." Wilder v.
Bernstein, 725 F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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Jewish foster care agencies favored children of those
religions to the detriment of other children in need of
placement, arguing that this disproportionately harmed
African American children." This claim was based in part
on the assertion that the religiously affiliated private
agencies provided "better service" via subcontracts with the
public agency than the public agency provided directly.45
The case resulted in a restructuring of the system to place
children in foster care in New York City without giving
preference
46 based on the religious affiliation of the child or
agency.
In Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., the ACLU filed a complaint at
the urging of a foster parent, Madeleine Smith, another
important "other" kept in the shadows of public family law.
She suffered from arthritis but had long cared for the
Gandy children as her foster children. The private agency
that placed the children sought removal of the children
based on the concern that Ms. Smith's arthritis was
becoming a problem in her ability to care for the children.47
The complaint by the ACLU on behalf of Ms. Smith and the
children demanded a full hearing before removal.48
The private provider agency, Catholic Guardian
Society, was a key participant in initiating the removal and
in the litigation but it was not represented as a party. Its
rights were purportedly subsumed under those of the public
agency with which it subcontracted to provide foster care
services. Because the city and state responded with due
process protections for foster parents at risk of losing the
foster children they had raised, the Court did not ultimately
reach the question of whether foster parents had a liberty
interest at stake. If they did hold such an interest, the court
reasoned that the procedures put in place were sufficient to
satisfy any such liberty interest.49
The Smith v. O.F.F.E.R. Court acknowledged the
44. See Wilder v. Bernstein 49 F.3d 69, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. Id. at 71; see David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v.
O.F.F.E.R., in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 67, 77-78 (Robert H. Mnookin ed.,
1985); Martin Guggenheim, State-SupportedFosterCare: The InterplayBetween
the Prohibitionof EstablishingReligion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents
and Children:Wilder v. Bernstein, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 603, 611 (1990).
46. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
47. See Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 822 n.1 (1977); Chambers &
Wald, supranote 45, at 68.
48. See Chambers & Wald, supranote 45, at 81.
49. See id.
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prevalence of private provider agencies when stating that
"in New York City, eighty-five percent of the children in
foster care are placed with voluntary child care agencies
licensed by the state."0 The Court went on to state that "the
foster child's loyalties, emotional involvement, and
responsibilities are often divided among three adult
figures-the natural parents, the foster parent, and the
social worker representing the foster care agency. " " This
court-created triangle does not include the public agency or
state at all. The Court also pointed to potential problems of
cultural bias and discrimination in the system by
recognizing the overrepresentation of the poor and
minorities. Over fifty percent of the children in care in New
York City were from female-headed households that were
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") at the time of the suit, and over seventy-five
percent of the children were black or Puerto Rican.52
After Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., the constitutional framework
underpinning family law remains limited to the parentchild-state triangular balance of rights and responsibilities.
The liberty interest of foster parents and important "others"
including the private provider agencies remains unclear.
Although the importance and prevalence of private
providers was acknowledged and recognized in both Wilder
and Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., they do not emerge as rights
holders with corresponding duties owed to the parent, child,
and state. This myopic view of family law remains, despite
the fact that important "others," including private
providers, have been an integral part of family life and
family law since colonial times.
II. EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE PROVIDERS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT

Evidence of the role of "important others" in the lives of
50. 431 U.S. at 825 n.11 (citing Brief for Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights
Division, as Amicus Curiae, 14, n.22). The Court in Wilder v. Bernstein
elaborates on the complexity of the roles played by private agencies. Even for
the 40% of children placed in kinship care or foster care provided by extended
family members, 30% are still supervised by private provider agencies. Wilder
v. Bernstein, 49 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1995).
51. Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. at 826 n.16.
52. Id. at 833-34.
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families and, in particular, in the identification and
protection of children can be traced from earliest colonial
days. Several examples of third party intervention into
child rearing illustrate the presence and importance of
participants outside the parent-child-state triad. Examples
are drawn from the last three centuries, not to give a full
history of child protection but to emphasize the presence
and importance of participants outside the parent-childstate framework. 3
In colonial times, community appointees and outside
families assisted categories of children deemed in need of
protection. These third parties entered into contracts with
the child's father or with local authorities who stood in
parens patriae to act on the child's behalf. Such
arrangements are the precursors of the modern publicprivate agency contracting which now operates in the
dependency system. These contractual relationships
continued into the nineteenth century when private
provider agencies first emerged during the Progressive Era.
The anti-cruelty societies predated the public agencies in
investigating and prosecuting child abuse and neglect.
Some of the agencies that formed during that era continue
to exist today as private provider agencies. Currently, they
subcontract with public agencies to provide services on
behalf of abused and neglected children and their families.
The next major development in the dependency system
occurred in the 1960's when states enacted reporting laws
and established public agencies to investigate, prosecute,
and treat cases of abuse and neglect. Because private
nonprofit groups had done much of the work of the new
public agencies for nearly a century, public agencies
subcontracted with the private agencies to continue to
provide the needed services. The codification of federal
requirements to make uniform the state responses to child
abuse and neglect began in the 1970s and provided federal
dollars to reimburse the states for their own work and for
the work the states subcontracted to the private agencies.
These developments are highlighted to illustrate the
ongoing, integral role of private providers throughout the
history of the dependency system. In the early twentieth
53. For a discussion of the origins of child welfare reaching back to
Elizabethan Poor Laws, see Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking:
In Search of the Least DrasticAlternative, 75 GEO. L. J. 1745, 1750 (1987).
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century when Meyer and Pierce formulated the parentchild-state framework, public state dependency agencies did
not yet exist but private providers were intervening and
providing families with an array of services. Private
providers continue to play an active role in the current
federal-state statutory scheme.
A. Colonial Indenturesto Insure the ProperRaising of
Children
Since the earliest colonial days, individuals and entities
outside of the family have played a role in monitoring
families in the community and offering informal guidance
to families deemed ill equipped to raise their children
properly.54 Individuals also contracted with authorities to
assume the paternal responsibility to raise children who
were involuntarily removed from their parents' homes.5
The "private" family and the parent-child-state balance of
rights and responsibilities belie the role of other caretakers
since earliest colonial times. These colonial "others" predate
the private providers that emerged as active caretakers of
children in the nineteenth century.
Colonial fathers were charged with the proper
upbringing of their children, responsible for educating and
training them to be productive citizens of the community.
Fathers who failed to properly instruct their children could
lose custody of the children." As early as the 1640s, the
colonial laws authorized public authorities to remove
children from their families and place them with other
families who could raise them in a manner deemed
appropriate. Colonial laws allowed private intervention
into the parent-child relationship to assure that child
rearing was appropriate for raising employable, moral
children. Tightly woven religious communities provided
moral guidance and often acted with public authorities to
provide supervision of family life.5"

54. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH iN AmERICA: A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. I,
1600-1865, 27-29 (Robert H. Bremer ed., 1970) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND

YOUTH, Vol. I].
55.
56.
57.
58.

See
See
See
See

id. at 28-29.
id. at 27-29.
id.
id.

1999] IMPORTANCE OFPRIVATE PROVIDERS

1415

Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular behoofe
& benefit to any Common-wealth; and whereas many parents &
masters are too indulgent and negligent of their duty in that
kinde. It is therefore ordered that the Select men of everie town, in
the severall precincts and quarters where they dwell, shall have a
vigilant eye over their brethren & neighbours, to fee, first that
none of them shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their
families as not to indeavour to teach by themselves or others, their
children & apprentices, so much learning as may inable them
perfectly to read the english tongue, & knowledge of the Capital
lawes ....Also that all masters of families doe once a week (at the
least) catechize their children and servants in the grounds &
principles of Religion... And further that all parents and masters
do breed & bring up their children & apprentices in some honest
lawful calling, labour or imploymet, either in husbandry, or some
other trade profitable for themselves, and the Common-wealth if
they will not or cannot
train them up in learning to fit them for
59
higher imployments.

In 1642, Massachusetts Bay enacted a law, to be
enforced through the courts, that children could be removed
from their parents' home involuntarily, based upon the
manner in which parents were raising them.
And if any of the Select men after admonition by them given to
such masters of families shal finde them still negligent of their
dutie in the particulars afore-mentioned, whereby children and
servants become rude, stubborn & unruly; the said Select men
with the help of two Magistrates, or the next County court for that
Shire, shall take such children or apprentices from them, & place
them with some masters for years (boyes till they come to twenty
one, and girls eighteen years of age compleat) which will more
strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto government
according to the rules of this order, if by 6fair
meanes and former
0
it.
instructions they will not be drawn unto

Such children were removed by the town authorities
and placed in an apprenticeship or indenture, called
"binding out."6 These indentures, or contracts to bind out
children, could be arranged voluntarily by parents seeking
training for their children or involuntarily by authorities
59.

THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAuuEs AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE

INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETS (1648) reprinted in HARvARD UNIVERSITY,
THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 11 (1929).

60. Id.
61. Id.
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that removed children from parents whose child rearing
was seen as inadequate.62 Involuntary indentures required
local authorities to contract with families to care for the
removed children. 63 These contracts were the first contrac-

ting to care for children whose families were considered
unable to properly raise them. Because the family unit was
considered a form of governance and social control at the
time, such involuntary indentures were not really publicprivate contracting as we understand it today. Yet, such
early colonial arrangements are evidence of substitute care
for children facilitated by local authorities; the same is true
with modern out-of-home care of children.
Methods to remedy perceived dereliction in the raising
of children relied on personal persuasion and local
authority. Local legal authorities often blurred the line
between voluntary and involuntary binding out of children.
In 1671, for example, in the cases of the children of Edward
Sanderson, the selectman in Watertown, Massachusetts
ordered the binding out of the children "with the consent of
their parents, if it may be had, and if the parents shall
oppose them to use the help of the Magistrate .....
In 1675, the General Court of Massachusetts created
the office of "tithingmen" and charged them with the
inspection of families.
[The tithesmen were authorized to] inspect the manner of all

disorderly persons, and where by more than private admonitions
they will not be reclaimed, they are from time to time to present

their names to the next Magistrate, or Commissioner invested
with magisterial power, who shall proceed against them as the law

directs. As also they are in like manner to present the names of
all single persons that live from under family government,

stubborn and disorderly children and servants, night-walkers,
tipplers, Sabbath breakers by night or by day, and such as absent

themselves from the public worship of God on the Lord's days, or
whatever else course or practice of any person or persons
whatsoever tending to debauchery, irreligion, profaneness, and
atheism amongst us, whether by omission of family government,
nurture, and religious duties, [or] instruction of children and

62. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supra note 54, at 64.
63. Id.
64. CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supra note 54, at 68 (citing Watertown
Records I, 103-104, 105, 107); see also Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants:
the American Colonial Model of Child Custody and Control, 2 INTL J.
CHILDREN's RTs. 317, 327-29 (1994).
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servants, or idle, profligate, uncivil or rude practices or any sort,
the names of all which persons with the fact whereof they are
accused, and witnesses thereof, they shall present to the next
Magistrate or Commissioner ... 65

The earliest colonial laws included provisions
prohibiting excessive corporal punishment of children." The
law did not provide for the removal of children for their
protection. The Bodie of Liberties addressed the issue of the
physical punishment of children by their parents in
Chapter 83 stating:
If any parents shall wilfullie and unreasonably deny any childe
timely or convenient marriage, or shall exercise any unnaturall
severtitie towards them, such childeren
67 shall have free libertie to
complaine to Authoritie for redresse."

There is, however, no evidence of colonial fathers being
punished for excessive corporal punishment alone.68 In fact,
corporal punishment of children was accepted and
encouraged in colonial times. The 1674 Records of the
Suffolk County Court record two instances, one involving
Governor Leveret's grandson, where parents were ordered
to whip their children at home in the presence of the
constable as punishment for misbehavior by the children.69
Even capital punishment for incorrigibility was codified.° It
65.

CHILDREN AND YOUTH,

Vol. I, supra note 54, at 42 (citing Mass. Records

VI, 240-41). For examples of other laws of the era, see id.
66. See The Body of Liberties of 1641: The Liberties of the Massachusets
Collonie in New England, 1641, in EDWIN POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: 1620-1692, 533 (1966). It is interesting to note that

assaults upon wives, except in self defense, were prohibited, whereas beating
children was only actionable if unnaturally severe. "Everie marryed woeman
shall be free from bodilie correction or stripes by her husband, unlesse it be in
his owne defence upon her assalt." Id. at 542.
67. WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS:
REPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 1672 (1890) (reprinting The Body of Liberties
of 1641, at 51). For a discussion of the English stockholder interests prompting
codification of colonial law, see ELIzABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 22 (1987).

68. See Mason, supra note 64; PLECK, supra note 67.
69. See POWERS, supra note 66, at 178.
70. The General Laws of Massachusetts Colony, 1658, state that a son who
is "stubborn and rebellious and will not obey [his parentsl voice and
chastisement, but lives in sundry and notorious crimes, such a son shall be put
to death." THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY 15 (1658)
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was inadequate discipline and moral education, not severe
corporal punishment, which was remedied by removal and
placement with contracting families.
Only in the mid-nineteenth century did legal
authorities begin to challenge paternal authority to
discipline children; for the first two hundred years of law in
America, children could be removed or bound out if their
own families did not raise them in what was then seen as
an appropriate manner. This subjective interpretation
allowed intervention focused mainly on the poor, freed
slaves, and child laborers. "' Physical assaults or injuries to
children by fathers were not a basis for intervention until
the 1800s.2

From the earliest colonial days through the antebellum
years, binding out remained the preferred way to deal with
children of the poor. Although the first orphanage was
established in 1728 in New Orleans, specialized
institutional care for children was scarce until the
(Capital Laws, ch.13.). This provision of the laws cited to Deuteronomy 22.
Before 1640, the ecclesiastical courts in England punished both children who
were violent toward their parents and husbands who were violent toward their
wives. "The details of family life were in no sense immune from correction and
overt regulation by the canon of law." R. H. Helmholz, And Were There
Children's Rights in Early Modern England?: The Canon Law and 'IntraFamily Violence' in England 1400-1640, 1 INTL J. CHILDREN'S RTS. 23, 30
(1993). Yet, those courts in England did not challenge parental authority to
prevent child maltreatment.
71. Mary Ann Mason examined the record of two Virginia parishes to
provide demographic information on involuntary apprentices. "Orphans
constituted 38.1% of all child apprentices; 39.3% were classified poor children;
11% were described as illegitimate; and 12.6% were termed mulatto." Mason,
supra note 64, at 326-27. This legacy is evident in the current dependency
system, which is disproportionately flooded with cases of neglect as is currently
culturally defined. In 1996, of the one million children who suffered confirmed
maltreatment, "52 percent suffered neglect; 24 percent physical abuse; 12
percent sexual abuse; six percent emotional maltreatment; and three percent
medical neglect." CHLDREN'S DEF. FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN

YEARBOOK 64-68 (1999). Similar data from the National Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect for 1995 indicates that for all children with substantiated or
indicated reports of maltreatment, 47% were neglected, 22% were physically
abused, 11% were sexually abused, 4% were either emotionally abused or
medically neglected. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AmmiCA, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE STATES 30 (1997). "African American children

comprised fifteen percent of the total U.S. child population, yet represented
twenty-eight percent of the children with substantiated abuse or neglect in
1995."Id. at 19.
72. For a discussion of prosecutions beginning in the mid-1800's, see infra
Part H (b).
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nineteenth century.73 Until that time, children of the poor
who could not be bound out to private families were placed
in almshouses, publicly operated warehouses for the poor

not segregated by age. ,

Michael Grossberg sums up the plight of poor children
before and just after the Revolution:
Thus, consistently the reality of poor-law apprenticeship belied the
legal ideal. Protective laws were subject to widely fluctuating
enforcement, not only among states but also localities, because of
the wide discretionary powers granted community authorities.
Moreover, poor apprentices as children "of the public," in the
words of a New Jersey justice in 1819, could not veto particular
indentures as could youths bound out voluntarily. Statutory
requirements mandating practical and moral training appear to
have been ignored with impunity, as was evidence of physical and
sexual abuse. In some communities, poor children continued to be
auctioned off to the lowest bidder along with other paupers. Freed
black children endured the most drastic curtailment of rights.
States like Kentucky, Missouri, and Indiana passed laws
eliminating the educational requirements of their indentures. In
other jurisdictions, masters received the right by statute to
indenture black children regardless of parental finances. Poor-law
73. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supra note 54, at 60-63.
74. In February 1775, of the 622 paupers on the books of the New York City
Almshouse, 259 were children, mostly under nine years of age. The authorities
made every effort to bind out even these young children. In 1788, laws were
passed allowing children in New York City, Albany and Hudson to be bound out
without parental consent. The mayor, recorder, or aldermen could approve such
an arrangement for any child found begging in the streets. By 1795, 40% of the
"inmates" at the alnshouse in New York City were children under nine years of
age. In 1797, following a yellow fever epidemic that filled the New York City
almshouse with widows and their children, a group of women founded the
Ladies Society for the Relief of Poor Widows with Small Children. The group
was incorporated by law in 1802. In-kind help was given to assist widows in
making a livelihood but no relief was granted to women who refused to place
out their children who were able to work. By 1800, the Society helped 152
widows with 420 children and in 1803 received state funding, raised by lottery,
to continue its work. In 1806, an orphanage was founded by the Society. At the
time, it was only the second such institution in the young country, the other
being in Charleston, South Carolina. See DAviD M. ScHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF
PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 1609-1866, at 179-189 (1938). Amidst the
development of institutional care for children in the mid-nineteenth century,
the population of children in almshouses continued to grow. The census of 1880
showed that 7,770 children between the ages of two and sixteen were in
almshouses in the United States. See Mason P. Thomas, Child Abuse and
Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50

N.C. L. REV. 293, 302 n.37 (1972) citing HOMER FOLKs, THE CARE OF DESTrrUTE,
NEGLECTED AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1-11 (1902).

1420

[Vol. 47

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

75
indentures,
servitude.

especially

for

blacks,

resembled

involuntary

Children of blacks also were subject to state "protective"
power via involuntary indenture created by emancipation
laws. On March 29, 1799, the legislature enacted its first
law providing for the gradual abolition of slavery in New
York State. After Independence Day of that year, a child
born of a slave was born free, but "such child should be the
servant of the legal owner of its mother until the age of
twenty-eight if a male and until twenty-five if a female,
under the same conditions as children 'bound to service by
overseers of the poor.' ,76 The law gave the slave owner the
ability to abandon his right to the child's service by
contacting the town clerk before the child's first birthday.
If the master chose not to keep the child as a servant, the
child was considered "abandoned."7 ' These abandoned
children established a new category of "states poor." The
state took responsibility for their support in the interval
between abandonment by the mother's owner and the time
of being bound out as paupers, by the overseers of the poor,
from the locality in which the slaveholder resided.
Child laborers brought over from England without their
parents were another category of children in need of state
protection to insure that their masters fulfilled their
contractual obligations.
More than half of all persons who came to the colonies south of
New England were indentured servants. Most servants were
younger than nineteen years old; the average age was between
fourteen and sixteen, and the youngest was six .... While most
children were not forcibly imported to the New World without
parents, separation from parents and forced labor were common in
all of the colonies. 9

In 1617, the Virginia Company sent correspondence to
the City of London seeking boatloads of child laborers to
help settle the colony. The Mayor of London agreed that the
children would be sent as apprentices until age twenty-one
75.
76.

MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 266
SCHNEIDER, supra note 74, at 208.

77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Mason, supra note 64, at 317 (citing
AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 391 (1946)).

RICHARD

(1985).

B. MORRIS,

GOVERNMENT

1999]

IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE PROVIDERS

1421

and afterward given fifty acres of land in fee simple for the
annual rent of one shilling. 0 The arrangement was a
success from the company's point of view.' The company
wanted more children to be sent for additional labor, and to
replace the children wlo died either in transit or after they
arrived in the New World.8" In response to the company's
request for more children, additional loads of 100 children
were sought and sent in 1619 and in 1622.83

Disciplinary action in lieu of parental authority on the
colonial side of the ocean needed to be provided for these
child laborers. The Privy Council for Virginia Company
declared:
And if any of them shall be found obstinate to resist or otherwise
to disobey such directions as shall be given in this behalf, we do
likewise hereby authorize such as shall have the charge of this
service to imprison, punish, and dispose any of those children,
upon any disorder by them or any of them committed, as cause
shall require, and so to ship them out toVirginia with as much
expedition as may stand with conveniency.

Other children were even less fortunate. They were
tricked into service abroad by "spirits" who received a wage
for each child delivered for passage.85 By the middle of the
seventeenth century, there is evidence that children were
kidnapped from London and transported to the colonies for
their labor. "One father obtained a warrant to search the
ship for his 11-year-old son whom he claimed had been
spirited away. The search uncovered 19 servants, 11 of
whom had been taken by 'spirits,' most against their will." 8
Since many of the children arrived in the New World with
no valid indentures, laws were established which required
the new master to go before the court to establish the terms
of the indenture. The Virginia Legislature established that
"[sluch persons as shall be imported, having no indenture or
covenant, either men or women, if they be above sixteen
80. See Mason, supra note 64, at 325 (citing ABBOT EMERSON SMITH,
COLONISTS INBONDAGE 148 (1965)).
81. See Mason, supranote 64, at 325.

82. See id.
83. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supra note 54, at 7-8 (citing Acts of the
Privy Council of England, 1619-1621, 118 (1930)).
84. Id.
85. See Mason, supranote 64, at 325.

86. Id.
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years old shall serve four years, if under fifteen to serve till
he or she shall be one and twenty
years of age, and the
87
courts to be judges of their ages."
Throughout the eighteenth century, public authorities
acted on behalf of poor, emancipated slave and contract
labor children to bind them out to masters who would
provide acceptable supervision and training. These
arrangements predated a uniform child protection system,
but they introduced interventions challenging parental care
or providing substitute care that would later be assumed by
nineteenth century anti-cruelty agencies. Historical beliefs
of appropriate child rearing triggered the colonial
interventions. Accepted notions of family life which began
to question the propriety of severe corporal punishment and
physical assaults prompted the later anti-cruelty agency
actions. Interventions to protect children from abuse and
contemporary definitions of neglect were more broadly and
uniformly applied through a wider array of private
agencies, state action, and federal legislation in the
twentieth century.
B. Intervention Based on Abuse and The Development of
PrivateAgencies
The middle of the nineteenth century brought cases of
criminal prosecutions against parents for beating their
children. These prosecutions introduced an era when the
legal system began to intervene in family life to protect
children from physical assaults at the hands of their
parents. At this nascent stage of development of a legal
response to child abuse, many children considered "poor" or
"neglected" were already under public supervision.8 Now,
the states began to prosecute cases of physical assaults by
parents on their children and to refer some of those children
to the community resources available for neglected

children.
The early cases prosecuting parents for physical
87. Id. (citing CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supranote 54, at 115).

88. This dual response invoking the criminal law for abuse and the civil law
for neglect has been carried over to the present dependency system, but today,
cases of abuse are a small but defining percentage in the civil system as well.
Discussed in Part ]IL cases of neglect make up the vast majority of current
caseloads but the system is driven by responses to egregious cases of abuse.
Abuse is sometimes concurrently criminally prosecuted. See Part HI, infra.
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assaults illustrate the historical hesitancy of the court to
infringe on parental authority on the basis of allegations of
physical beatings by fathers. Such intrusions would
challenge the accepted paternal role and parenting
prerogatives. The texts reveal a range of legal questions
posed by the courts in attempting to redefine the limits of
state intervention. Courts debated whether it was the state
of mind of the parent when perpetrating the beating,89 the
instrument used in the beating,0 or the injury caused by
the beating which should constitute evidence of abuse
sufficient to sustain a prosecution. 9' Courts searched for
objective measures of actionable abuse to avoid over89. In Stanfield v. State, the court rejected the lower court charge, which
focused on the instrument used in the beating, instead focusing on the manner
of the Defendant.
The charge asked and given does not mend the matter, which was that
the jury could not convict the defendant 'unless the chastisement was
done in a cruel or vindictive manner.' Was the correction moderate? If
it was, defendant was not guilty of an assault and battery at all
(citation omitted). If it was not moderate, but excessive, he was guilty
as charged of an aggravated assault and battery by having exceeded
the boundary of his legal right as guardian under the law, and placed
himself in the attitude of a stranger and not a parent to the child.
Whether it is moderate or excessive must necessarily depend upon the
age, sex, condition and disposition of the child, with all the attending
and surrounding circumstances, to be judged of by the jury....
43 Tenn. 167, 168 (Austin Term 1875).
In Johnson v. State, similar reasoning was used.
The right of parents to chastise their refractory and disobedient
children is so necessary to the government of families, to the good of
society, that no moralist or lawgiver has ever thought of interfering
with its existence, or of calling upon them to account for the manner of
its exercise, upon light or frivolous pretenses. But, at the same time,
that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for the
safety of the child it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be
carried. In chastising a child, the parent must be careful that he does
not exceed the bounds of moderation and inflict cruel and merciless
punishment; if he do, he is a trespasser, and liable to be punished by
indictment. It is not, then, the infliction of punishment, but the excess,
which constitutes the offence, and what this excess shall be is not a
conclusion of law, but a question of fact for the determination of the

jury.

21 Tenn. 291 (No. 283) (noting that the case was decided in Nashville but was
unreported. Dates not given).
90. In Neal v. Georgia, the court affirmed that one "lick" with an old saw
was "cruel and outrageous abuse of the parental authority and made the
perpetrator of it guilty," while also noting that a "very large margin must be left
open to the parent." 54 Ga. 281, 282 (1875).
91. SeeState v. Jones, 95 N.C. 465, 466 (1886).
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intrusion into family government. Finding evidence of a
permanent serious injury was necessary to find a parent

guilty.
It will be observed that the test of the defendant's
criminal liability is the infliction of a punishment 'cruel
and excessive,' and thus it is left to the jury without the
aid of any rule of law for their guidance to determine. It
is quite obvious that this would subject every exercise
of parental authority in the correction and discipline of
chldren- in other words, domestic government- to
the supervision and control of jurors, who might, in a
given case, deem the punishment disproportionate to
the offense, and unreasonable and excessive. It seems
to us, that such a rule would tend, if not to subvert
family government, greatly to impair its efficiency, and
remove restraints upon the conduct of children ....
The test then of criminal responsibility is the infliction
of permanent injury by means of the administered
punishment, or that it proceeded from malice and was
not in the exercise of a corrective authority. We do not
propose to palliate or excuse the conduct of the
def6ndant in the present case. The punishment seems
to have been needlessly severe, but we refuse to take
cognizance of it as a criminal act, because it belongs to
the domestic rather than legal power, to a domain into
which the penal law is reluctant to enter, unless
induced by an imperious necessity.These criminal prosecutions are contemporaneous with
the more famous 1874 case of Mary Ellen." The case was
championed in the front pages of the New York Times. It
was brought by leaders of the New York Society for the
Protection of Cruelty to Animals, heralding an era of
private philanthropic agencies acting on behalf of abused
children. 4
The Society leaders argued to the court on behalf of
92. Id.
93. See Lela B. Costin, Unraveling the Mary Ellen Legend: Origins of the
"Cruelty"Movement, 1992 SOc. SERVICES REV. 203 (1991).
94. For a summary discussion of earlier foundations of child protection in

response to child labor and orphans in colonial times and through the civil war,
see Neil A. Cohen, Child Welfare History in the United States, in CHILD
WELFARE: A MuLTicuLTuRAL Focus 13 (Neil A. Cohen ed., 1992). For a

discussion of the emergence of protection of children within the societies for the

protection of cruelty to animals before the Mary Ellen case, see Costin, supra
note 93.
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Mary Ellen, a young girl whose care was at issue, that
children, as members of the animal kingdom, were entitled
to protections at least equal to those provided animals.95
The arguments were fashioned by Henry Bergh, founder
and president of the Society, and Elbridge T. Gerry, counsel
for the Society. The case succinctly depicts the roles that
"important others" could assume on behalf of children,
awareness of abusive activity in "private" families,
investigation on behalf of children, rescue, prosecution, and
placement. The New York Times article of April 10, 1874
opened:
It appears from proceedings had in Supreme Court yesterday, in
the case of a child named Mary Ellen, that Mr. Bergh does not
confine the humane impulses of his heart to smoothing the
pathway of the brute creation toward the grave or elsewhere, but
that he embraces within the sphere of his kindly efforts the human
species also.96

The news articles explained that the child had been
discovered when a woman, Etta Angell Wheeler, was on an
"errand of mercy" to a dying woman. She was told by the
woman of the desperate cries of a child in the next
tenement building. Wheeler had tried repeatedly to gain
entrance to the apartment to see the child. She was
eventually let into the flat when Mr. Connolly, the man of
the house, was not present, and she was able to observe and
have a short visit with Mary Connolly, his wife, and Mary
Ellen. Reports indicate that Wheeler went to several
institutions to seek help for the child, before she found
Bergh and pleaded for his assistance. 97 It was known at the
first hearing that Mary Ellen was living with Mary and
Francis Connolly and they were charged with cruel abuse
95. See Costin, supranote 93, at 204.
96. Mr. Bergh EnlargingHis Sphere of Usefulness: Inhuman Treatment of a
Little Waif-Her Treatment-A Mystery to Be Cleared Up, N. Y. TIMES, April 10,
1874.
97. Perhaps because Mrs. Wheeler's husband was a newspaper man, the
case is graphically and fully reported in the paper. See Costin, supranote 93, at
210; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2; N.Y.
T S, Apr. 14, 1874, at 2; N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 28, 1874, at 8; N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27,
1874, at 12. For a compilation of related articles and papers of the New York
Society for The Prevention of Cruelty to Children, see CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
AMiCA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. II, 1866-1932 Parts 1-6, 185-97 (Robert
H. Bremner ed., 1971) [hereinafter CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. II, Parts 1-61.
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against her, but that they were not her natural parents."
How this casual custodianship affected the willingness of
the agency, court and jiublic to champion prosecution of the
Connollys is not clear.
On the second day of the court proceedings, Mrs.
Connolly took the stand and detailed how the child came to
be in their custody.' Mrs. Connolly testified that she was
formally married to Mr. Thomas McCormack who was now
deceased. They had three children together, all of whom
also were deceased. Mrs. Connolly testified that the
Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, who released
the child to them, never inquired as to her relation to the
child. He had the name of Wilson down as the child's
natural mother.'0 ' Mrs. Connolly reportedly testified that
she never knew the whereabouts of the mother, but from
time to time would hear from her husband's drinking
buddies that she was still living downtown. 2 Mrs. Connolly
further testified that she never received a cent to care for
the child. She reported annually to the Commissioner of
Charities and Corrections on the condition of the child,
missing the reporting requirement only two times.' 3
The case was originally prosecuted against both Mr.
and Mrs. Connolly. Mary Ellen's ill health, lack of proper
clothing and frequent abuse with whips, scissors, and slaps
must have been known, if not perpetrated, by both adults in
98. See The Mission of Humanity, N.Y. TIIES, Apr. 11, 1874, at 2; Costin,
supra note 93, at 207; CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. H, Parts 1-6, supra note 97, at
187.
99. Because he was deceased, this case did not impinge on the rights of
Mary Ellen's father. Mary Ellen's mother's rights are not at issue in the

prosecution because her mother had abandoned her or had been separated from

her much earlier, so her rights are not at issue in the prosecution. Mary

Connolly, taking on the custodianship of Mary Ellen as her stepmother, may

have been prosecuted because of this legal relationship. It is also possible that
she was prosecuted, despite her ultimate willingness to allow Mrs. Wheeler into
the flat against the wishes of her husband, because she was the "mother" of the

child and was therefore responsible for her care under nineteenth century
notions of parenting. Mr. Connolly's drunkenness, violence against Mary Ellen
and possible violence against Mrs. Connolly are ignored, perhaps because he
had no legal relationship to the child or perhaps because his behavior, as an
unrelated "man in the house" was not as shocking to the norms of child care at
the time.
100. The Mission of Humanity, NEWYORK TIMES, Apr. 11, 1874 at 2.
101. See CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supranote 54, at 187.
102. See id.
103. See id.
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the home. Even if this could not be proven, it was only Mrs.
Connolly, on a day when Mr. Connolly was not present, who
allowed Mrs. Wheeler into the apartment to discuss Mary
Ellen. Only Mrs. Connolly ever appeared in court. Only she
was ultimately tried and sentenced for the abuse.14 This
celebrated abuse case targeted the "mother" caretaker. No
male was held accountable. The case signals the entry of
private philanthropic agencies into the legal system on
behalf of abused and neglected children. It also foreshadows
the treatment of mothers and lack of attention paid to
holding fathers accountable before dependency courts.0 5
The publicity surrounding this case led to important
results for the future of child protection. The activities of
private provider agencies acting on behalf of abused and
neglected children increased significantly. In the same year,
a private provider agency, the New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, was formed with
Elbridge Gerry as its counsel.0 6 By 1880, thirty-three such
societies existed in the United States 7 , most of them in the
business of rescuing both animals and children. As Bergh
explained:
The protection of children and the protection of animals are

combined because the principle involved, i.e., their helplessness, is
the same; because all life is the same, differing only in degree of

development and expression;
association with the other. 08

and because each profits by

104. See Mrs. Connolly, the Guardian,Found Guilty, and Sentenced to One
Year's Imprisonment at HardLabor, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1874, at 8.
105. See generally MARIE ASHE, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representation of "Bad Mothers", in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 142-66 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A
Problemfor Feminist Theory, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993); V. Pualani Enos,
ProsecutingBattered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women
and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1996); NATIONAL CENTER ON
WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, FAILURE TO PROTECT: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR NEW
YORK ATTORNEYs REPRESENTING BATTERED WOMEN AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR
PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT THEIR CHILDREN FROM THE ABUSER

(1993).
106. See

CHILDREN AND YOUTH, Vol. I, supra note 54, at 189-97.
107. See Linda Gordon, Child Abuse, Gender and the Myth of Family
Independence: Thoughts on the History of Family Violence and Its Social
Control 1880-1920, 12 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523 (1983-84).
108. See Costin, supra note 93, at 213.
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These early efforts were aimed at rescuing children
and, sometimes, prosecuting the adults who brutalized
them. The societies did not see as their mission the housing
or care of children, or treatment of the families. As Gerry
explained:
The SPCC was simply created as a hand affixed to the arm of the
law, by which the body politic reaches out and enforces the law.
The arm of the law seizes the child when it is in an atmosphere of
impurity, or in the care of those who are not fit to be entrusted
with it, wrenches the child out of these surroundings, brings it to
the court, and submits it to the decision of the court- unless, on the
other hand, it reaches out that arm of the law to the cruelist,
seizes him within its grasp, brings him also to the criminal court
and insures his prosecution and punishment. These are the
functions of our societies.0 9

The early use of criminal courts to prosecute abuse
provided a legal response to child abuse and neglect on two
fronts: civil procedures to place "needy" children in public
care, and criminal actions on behalf of abused children.
Private agencies filled vital roles at each stage of the
criminal and civil process: rescuing, placing and working
with children and their families to prevent further
instances of abuse." ° Philanthropic agencies continued and
109. Elbridge Gerry, Thirty FirstAnnual Meeting of the American Humane
Association (Albany, N.Y. 1907), cited in Costin, supra note 93, at 219. At this
1907 speech at the Annual Meeting of the Society, Gerry was also clear that the
society's purpose was to rescue children and refer their parents for prosecution,
not to provide treatment. The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children ("N.Y.S.P.C.C.") was "not created for the purpose of educating or
reforming children, or seeing that they were transported into other homes." Id.
This description was meant in part to differentiate the purposes of the Society
from the work of the New York Children's Aid Society which gathered up
children from the industrializing Northeast cities and sent them on "orphan
trains" to the rural Midwest where they were given "proper homes" through an
informal indenture. These rescue efforts are also distinguishable from turn-ofthe-century child protectionefforts. Carl Carstens led the first of these agencies,
the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. In 1907, at
that Society's Annual Meeting, Carstens stated the broader mission of child
protection: "Children will still need to be rescued from degrading surroundings
for many years to come but the society recognizes more definitely that it is a
preventive agency." MASSACHUSETTS SOC. FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
CHILDREN, 1907 ANNUAL REPORT 27, cited in Paul Gerard Anderson, The Origin,
Emergence, and ProfessionalRecognition of Child Protection, 63 SOC. SERVICES
REV. 222 (1989).

110. See supra note 109 for earlier examples of the three types of efforts:
rescuing (N.Y.), placing (Children's Aid Soc.) and working with children
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grew throughout the early twentieth century, when states
also began to play a role in the protection of children, often
in concert with the already established agencies.
C. Twentieth Century State and FederalLegislation
Until the mid-twentieth century, private provider
agencies championed interventions on behalf of abused and
neglected children. States made fledgling efforts on behalf
of individual children but neither the civil nor the criminal
response was uniform or broadly applied. State criminal
prosecutions for abuse continued without any federal
legislative guidance into the 1970s.
A seminal event in the history of the legal response to
child abuse and neglect was the 1962 publication of
Battered Child Syndrome by Dr. Henry Kempe."' Kempe
was a pediatrician who worked with pediatrics and
radiology to identify causes of suspicious injuries to
children."' With new knowledge about injuries that could
only be caused by abusive behavior, states moved to codify
their response. Between 1963 and 1967, every state passed
a statute requiring some form of reporting of incidents of
child abuse. Like early rescue efforts, these laws focused on
incidents of abuse, not on treatment, prevention or larger
social issues contributing to child maltreatment. 1
lg
In 1971, Dr. Kempe attempted to expand the response
to child maltreatment to include harms other than abusive

(Massachusetts).
111. See C. Henry Kempe, et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N. 1 (1962).
112. See C. Henry Kempe, Paediatric Implications of the Battered Baby
Syndrome, 46 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 28 (1971).
113. Barbara Nelson wrote:
The first people to identify a problem often shape how others will
perceive it. Nowhere is this truer than with the issue of child abuse. In
"The Battered Child Syndrome," Kempe and his associates define the
problem as "a clinical condition in young children who received serious
physical abuse, generally from a parent or foster parent." The

individually centered psychological construction of the problem made it
seem very self-contained. Governmental response to a self-contained,

serious, but noncontroversial issue ought to be easy to obtain. And easy
it was. [Albuse reporting laws ...

were rapidly passed by all state

legislatures.
BARBARA NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA SETrING
FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 13 (1984) (citing Kempe, et al., supranote 111, at 17).
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physical injuries.14 '"Battered child syndrome must be
thought of as only the extreme form of a whole spectrum of
non-accidental injury and deprivation of children.""' In
describing the diagnosis of "failure to thrive," Dr. Kempe
referred to the failure to provide adequate "mothering."
Perhaps the most puzzling and important syndrome of infancy is
loosely called "failure to thrive," and in our experience in Denver,
all the congenital and acquired conditions of paediatric pathology
taken together account for only 80% of these cases. But 20%, the
largest single group, are due to deficiency in mothering, either not
enough food, or emotional neglect, or aversion. It is a serious and
often missed, form of the battered child syndrome. It does no good
to prove to the mother the child is indeed all right, since her seeing
the child as being not all right is an important diagnostic tool, and
her inability to mother the child successfully is simply reinforced

by the hospital demonstration that the nurses do better."'

These early articles had tremendous impact on the
recognition of child abuse as a widespread and medically
diagnosable problem. Also, language used by Dr. Kempe
seemed to reinforce gendered notions of parenting that hold
mothers responsible for the well being of children.
Dr. Kempe played an integral role in the 1973 U.S.
Senate hearings and in the design of the first federal
legislation addressing child abuse and neglect, The Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA")." 7 His
early focus on the most extreme forms of abuse, his early
clinically contained diagnosis of the problem, and his later
gendered discussion of the spectrum of the syndrome were
adopted by the legislators looking for a politically plausible
bill to address child abuse. This narrow focus fit well into a
parent-child-state vision of child abuse and neglect when
the key intervention would be by a public agency into a
private, abusive family. Even within the framework of this
limited ground for intervention, where larger causes of
114. See Kempe, supranote 112.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 31. At times in the article, Dr. Kempe does refer to mothering as
a problem of mothers and fathers, but the term "parenting" or "caretaking" is
not chosen. The gendered reality of whom is seen as responsible for the care of
the children is clear. The failure of "mothering" is emphasized throughout. See,
e.g., id. at 30.
117. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 5101
et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
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abuse and neglect and service-oriented responses were not
considered, private individuals played a key role in being
delegated to report abuse.
In 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on Children and
Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held
hearings in Washington and at children's hospitals around
the country on the proposed Act."' Bills were introduced in
both the House and Senate, but the Senate subcommittee
chaired by Walter Mondale held the main hearings. In a
letter of transmittal to the Senate Committee Chairman,
Mondale explained the need for the legislation:
The Subcommittee held hearings in Washington, New York,
Denver and Los Angeles. Members of the Subcommittee personally
visited victims of child abuse in hospitals and observed firsthand
the operations of multi disciplinary child abuse teams in several
cities. We were appalled to learn how many abused and neglected
children there are and how little is being done to help them and
their troubled families. Statistics vary widely, but there is little
question that thousands and thousands of youngsters suffer severe
physical and emotional abuse every year. This is a problem that
cuts across social and economic barriers. It occurs in all kinds of
neighborhoods. Yet there was no focused Federal effort to deal
with the problem. Nowhere in the Federal government could we
find one official assigned full time to the prevention, identification
and treatment of child abuse and neglect.

Toward the end of the hearings in Denver, Mondale
explicitly explained his reasons for limiting the discussion
to the most serious cases of physical abuse:
You know, I agree that the problem of child neglect and
disadvantage goes far beyond the abnormal battering that we have
discussed. But as one who has tried to take the total view and
failed, I feel more and more we have to attack these problems one
by one. I worked for 5 years on the Child Development Act, which
was my bill, and I fought for it. It was designed to focus on
disadvantage and the problems of welfare and working-mothers,
the strengthening of the family, the nutrition problem, the health
problem, the health of the mother during pregnancy, the whole
bag .... What distresses me is that the environment we are
working in couldn't be worse, because we have a President who
118. See Child Abuse PreventionAct, 1973: Hearings on S. 1191 Before the
Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong. 2 (1973) [hereinafter Mondale Hearings].
119. Id. at 2 (letter of Walter Mondale to Hon. Harrison A. Williams).

1432

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

says that human programs are romanticism, that they are robbing
America of its God-given belief in self-reliance. You know, I
thought what we were trying to do was to assist people to be selfreliant, to help them with problems which destroy their capacity
for that objective in American life. So we not only had the child
care bill vetoed but we had some very harsh rhetoric about how we
were trying to break up the American family, installing
a national
20
system of communal living; you've heard all the rest.

Under Mondale's tight stewardship, the hearings on the
first federal legislation to address child abuse were limited
to examining child abuse as instances of deviant, severe
physical abuse within families by parents, depicted as
mothers. 2' These could be contained and addressed with a
limited governmental response, that was, in Mondale's
view, all that was politically feasible at the time.'22 The
larger role of service providers in alleviating the causes and
consequences of abuse and neglect were kept out of the
discussion.
Instead of adopting a model for government
involvement which sought to help children and their
mothers by identifying the context for abuse and providing
a circle of community responses to help prevent abuse and
neglect," the law focused on the politically acceptable
120. Id. at 300.
121. The hearings began in Washington in March 1973. They were opened
by Senator Mondale, who began with the story of the recent conviction of the
stepmother of Donna Stern from nearby Maryland. Referred to by Mondale as
the "stepmother of Donna Stern" and never by name, the horrible acts
perpetrated on the child by the stepmother were related to the subcommittee by
Mondale. They were told that: "Ugly as it sounds, this is not an isolated case."
Id. at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Mondale). Newspaper articles on the case
are included as Press Reports in the Hearing Report. Id. at 671-82.
The second witness on the first day of the hearings was Jolly K., founder of
Parent's Anonymous. In response to questions by the senators, Jolly K.
described in clear detail the "extreme physical abuse" which she perpetrated
against her daughter. Id. at 49-50. Jolly K. was the only abusive or formerly
abusive parent to testify at the hearings. The abusive mother, as personified by
Jolly K. and the Donna Stern case, perpetrating severe physical abuse,
dominated that first day of hearings and became a reference point for the
subsequent hearings. Id.
122. See Mondale Hearings, supra note 118, at 46-47 (remarks by Sen.
Mondale).
123. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by
Home": Toward a CommunitarianTheory of the "Nontraditional"
Family," 1996
UTAH L. REV. 569 (discussing the changing identity of the family in the United
States). Martha Minow has championed a more expansive discourse of
children's rights, linking children's and women's rights to describe a "new
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mechanisms of reporting incidents and investigating them,
thereby mandating a police-like response which focused on
state investigation of "private" families. 24 This focus on
mandating state intervention followed the parent-childstate framework. Justification for intervention was key to
the inquiry, not maintenance of the welfare of children. The
state's role was to intervene into the family, perpetuating
the triangular framework and ignoring the larger
community context for abuse and neglect and community
resources for treatment.

CAPTA initiated a federal response to child abuse. It

formulated the mandates for the development of a
bureaucracy within the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare ("HEW") (now called the Department of Health

and Human Services) to gather information and expertise
on the problem of child abuse, a largely undocumented
It also provided funding through
subject at the time.'
HEW for state demonstration projects that were broadly
defined in terms of federal directives for their operation."'
Most important in terms of the subsequent history of the
federal/state relationship in addressing child abuse, CAPTA
contained provisions that established a grant program. 2"
Unlike the demonstration projects, eligibility for grants
required states to follow a series of mandates in order to
receive the funds. 28 Those provisions concerned reporting,
investigating, confidentiality of record keeping, and law
enforcement cooperation.'29 They were the earliest version
generation" of relational rights. Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation:
A FeministApproach to Children'sRights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 3 (1986).
124. In 1996, 3.1 million children were reported abused and neglected.
Investigations of those reports resulted in a finding by the public agency that
nearly one million children were abused and neglected. CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND,
supra note 71, at 85. This means that while the state apparatus collects reports
on over three million children and investigates those cases which could possibly
meet the legal definition of abuse or neglect, only one-third of those cases
proceed past the investigation stage. Of that one million, only a fraction
receives any services. The public agency is largely a reporting, investigation,
and record keeping system.
125. See Mondale Hearings,supranote 118 (Letter of Transmittal).
126. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), Pub. L. No.
93-247, § 4, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) & (b) (1994
& Supp. 1997)) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (a) & (b) 1974).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See CAPTA, § 4(b)(3). Reference in this section is to Parts A and B of
Title IV of the Social Security Act, which contained provisions for Aid to
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of the more complete and complicated federal-to-state
reimbursement system which funds state dependency
systems today.
The key state response to child abuse became the
mandatory reporting, investigating, and record keeping
system that is commonly known as the child protective
services system. While all states had some form of reporting
law in place before CAPTA, few met the more rigorous
CAPTA requirements before 1974. CAPTA, in effect,
maintained continuing attention on reporting laws,
confidentiality, and investigation.
By limiting the scope of the 1973 hearings to address
the most serious forms of physical abuse, the subcommittee
members created a dialogue with witnesses.' The position
of the legislators made a child protective services system,
not a treatment system, necessary and viable. By focusing
exclusively on the extreme end of the abuse/neglect
spectrum, the Senators logically responded with the police
power of the state justified by the parens patriae power.
They did not consider the preventive, treatment, and
placement services provided by private agencies and other
community resources because, perhaps accurately, such an
approach was not politically feasible at the time.
Following passage of CAPTA, the numbers of children
reported as abused and neglected exploded, and state-based
foster care systems were flooded with children placed as a
result of reporting and investigation through child
protective services. Senator Cranston summarized the
situation before the Senate in 1979:
The number of children in foster care in 1977 was approximately
500,000-nearly three times the number of children in foster care
as compared to 1961. In only one of every five cases does the
services plan for these foster children recommend a specific length
of placement. In other words, the so-called temporary provision of
foster care has no definite target date for ending the placement
and for placing the child in a permanent family setting. Over half
the children in foster care have been away from their families for
more than 2 years- about 100,000 children have spent more than 6
years of their lives in foster care. Nearly one-fourth of the children
have been in three or more foster family homes. Even in cases
where the agency had developed a plan for returning the child to
Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid.
130. See Mondale Hearings,supra note 118, at 49.
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his or her home, in one-third of the cases, there was no plan for
visits between the child and the parent or another person who
would care for the child if returned home. There are more than
100,000 children in foster care awaiting adoption.'3

In many cases, reports and investigations were
prompted by cases of neglect-usually children left
unattended-but without the development of a spectrum of
services to assist families, foster care was the expedient and
132
perhaps sole resource to address the children's safety.
Concerns that children were being unnecessarily placed
outside their homes and were languishing without
permanency in foster care led to passage of the Adoption
133
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA").
This federal law imposed the mandate that states provide a
plan to the federal government requiring the state-based
public agency to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent
placement or achieve reunification for children temporarily
placed in foster care. The law also provided for adoption
subsidies to encourage the adoption of children out of foster
care who could not be reunified. 3 State laws codified the
reasonable efforts language in their laws. If states failed to
meet the mandates of the law, they would not be eligible for
matching federal reimbursement for their foster care
expenses.
As a consequence of the fiscal incentives offered in
AACWA, family preservation efforts flourished and the
36
number of children in foster care began to decrease.
Private provider agencies were an integral component of
the dependency system that was now increasing its focus on
prevention and treatment. They provided not only foster
care but also an array of in-home services such as case
management, homemaker services, childcare, and mental
health services. As the menu of needed preventive services
increased because of the new focus on family preservation,
the work of private provider agencies expanded.
In the 1990s, the number of children in foster care
131. 125 CoNG. REc. 110,59 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
132. See id.
133. Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§
602, 608, 620-28, & 670-76 (1997)).
134. See 42 U.S.C. §. 671 (a)(15)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a).
136. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN
YEARBOOK 22 (1994).
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began to increase once again. While the reasons for this are
complex, the increase is usually attributed to the crack
epidemic in the inner cities and the increasing percentage
of children living in desperately poor conditions with young,
unmarried mothers.' A series of highly publicized brutal
deaths of children who were "known to the public agency"
and provided with preventive services instead of being
placed in foster care led yet again to an outcry for reform of
the system."8
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA")
was a partial response both to the outcry for swifter
removal from abusive homes and for expedited adoptions.'39
The new law provides exceptions to the reasonable efforts
requirement when "aggravated circumstances" are
present.14 The section providing for the exceptions appears

uncontroversial at first glance, citing torture, death of
another child, or sexual abuse as examples; but a more
broad exception may come from leaving it to the states to
define "aggravated circumstances." 4 ' The operational effect

of the law is yet unclear, but it is significant in signaling
the first mandated retreat from reunification efforts.29
Likewise, the effect of this mandate in compressing the
spectrum and volume of preventive services is unclear.
Since private provider agencies also provide placement and
adoption services, the agency emphasis may shift, but their
role will remain integral to the functioning of the
dependency system and the well-being of children.
The federal and state legislative and executive branches
regulating the changes to the dependency system from 1960
to the present recognized the states' reliance on private
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD ABUSE, FINAL REPORT
(1996).
139. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§671 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1998).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(D)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
141. Id.
142. We do not yet know the effect of allowing states to limit the cases in
which reunification services are provided. State laws were recently amended to
clarify the new reasonable efforts requirements. See, e.g., 1999 N.Y. Laws Ch. 7
(A-962-A) (amending N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a). A broad amendment by
states to the requirement of providing reunification services could further shift
the balance in focus by private providers away from reunification and toward
removal, placement, and adoption for more children. Effect of such a shift on
the arguments made in this paper is yet unclear.
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provider agencies. Concurrent with the development of a
federal-state regime to mandate and regulate the provision
of services to abused and neglected children were changes
in federal law that eventually allowed public agencies to
contract with private providers for services reimbursed with
federal dollars. In 1962, amendments to the Social Security
Act allowed public agencies to subcontract with other public
agencies to deliver needed services.'43 In the 1967
amendments to the Social Security Act, subcontracting was
extended to allow contracts between public agencies and
private agencies.'
As the states established public systems to respond to
abuse and neglect, the federal government, through Social
Security Act amendments, allowed reimbursement for
needed services provided by private agencies via
subcontracts with public agencies.14 The federal mandates
in 1974 and 1980 put even more pressure on state-based
public agencies to provide an array of services, and
therefore to subcontract with private agencies available to
provide those services. Federal law simultaneously removed
obstacles to reimbursement for these services by allowing
federal dollars to reimburse the public agencies for these
subcontracted services. 46
Recently, the law has changed to expand the range of
agencies eligible for reimbursable dollars. The 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act,
commonly known as 'Welfare Reform," quietly amended the
Social Security Act to allow for-profit agencies to
subcontract with public agencies to provide child welfare
services. 147 No concurrent legislation or regulations have
been promulgated regarding limits or oversight for the for143. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 155(a),
76 Stat. 172 (1962).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (c)(1994 & Supp. 1998).
145. For a fuller discussion of these amendments, see Peter M. Kettner &
Lawrence L. Martin, Accountability in Purchase of Service Contracting,in TBE
PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES: POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES 183-201,
(Margaret Gibelman & Howard Demone eds., 1998); Ronald P. Burd & Julius B.
Richmond, The Public and Private Sector: A Developing Partnershipin Human
Services, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 218 (1979).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(c).
147. See id. See also Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization,and

Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1999); Nina
Bernstein, Deletion of One Word in Welfare Bill Opens Foster Care to Big
Business, N.Y. TIMldS, May 4, 1997, at Al.
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profit entities. Unlike the private non-profit agencies that
have provided services in a variety of ways since the midnineteenth century, these for-profit interests are new
players in the child welfare system. Their impact on the
role of private providers in the dependency system is
uncharted, but their presence suggests interesting
comparisons and contrasts for future research. 8
III. CURRENT SYSTEM ALLOWING PARTICIPATION BY PRIVATE
PROVIDERS

A. The CurrentSystem
The child protective services system, the front end of
the dependency system, is triggered by a report of abuse or
neglect as defined in state law under the requirements of
CAPTA. Reports are made by voluntary or mandated
reporters to hotlines that federal law requires every state to
operate. 4 1 Voluntary reports can be made by neighbors,
friends, family members-anyone who suspects child abuse
or neglect on the part of a caretaker. 5 If the reporter
provides adequate information to the hotline operator, the
report triggers investigation by the local child protection
agency. 5 ' Private individuals are vitally involved in
activating the child protective services system through
reporting, but hotlines are maintained and initial
investigations are done by the public agency.
Mandated reporters are crucial to the child protective
services system. Through mandated reporting, the parens
patriae power of the state is exercised to conscript
professionals who work with children to become partial
state agents in protecting children from harm. These
reporters generally are persons who work in professions or
148. Private corporations have been providing placement services in the
juvenile justice system and have raised concerns about the quality of services
provided and the profits extracted from the system. See, e.g. Fox Butterfield,
Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1998, at Al.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106A(b).
150. Abuse by a non-caretaker can only be pursued criminally. The civil
system is reserved for intra-familial violence.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (b). For examples of state operational directives,
see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422 (2)(a) (McKinney 1992); Boland v. State, 638
N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't 1996).
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roles that bring them into contact with children.'52 If these
professionals suspect or believe that children with whom
they come into contact in the course of their employment
are suffering from abuse or neglect, confidentiality and
privilege are forfeited and the professionals are mandated
to report the abuse or neglect to the state operated child
protection system. Some states require that professionals
who work with parents and have reason to suspect abuse
are also mandated to report.5 '
These professionals are not merely invited to
participate on behalf of children; they are required to do so
regardless of their professional opinion as to the wisdom,
value, or safety of reporting. 5 4 In effect, the state forces
professionals to participate and invites the non-professional
community member, the modern day Etta Angel Wheeler,
to make reports voluntarily. This reporting system was not
a novel creation in the 1960's; rather, it was an evolving
codification of the child protection system developed since
colonial times and expanded by private philanthropic
agencies at the turn of the century.
In 1996, the last year for which statistics are available,
approximately 3 million children were reported abused or
neglected.'55 Depending on the severity of the allegations,
child protective services workers must respond within the
period of time required by state law to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations.'56 If
the workers find that there is not sufficient evidence, the
reports are considered "unfounded" and the cases are
closed.'57 Of the three million reports in 1995, investigation
by agencies confirmed that abuse or neglect had occurred in
approximately one million cases."' In other words, each
year, over two million cases are investigated but no further
action is deemed necessary.'
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106A(b).
153. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 413 (MoKinney 1992).
154. MURRAY LEvINE & HOwARD J. DOUECK, THE IMPACT OF MANDATED
REPORTING ON THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS (1995).
155. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supranote 71, at 92.

156. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(6) (McKinney 1992).
157. See id. § 424(7).
158. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supra note 71, at 68; CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AM., supranote 71, at 3.

159. In New York, as a result of the death of Eliza Izquierdo, the law was
amended to keep records of unsubstantiated reports for use in future
investigations. The law is known as "Eliza's Law." N. Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §
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Among substantiated reports, data shows that African
American children are over-represented; African American
children comprise fifteen percent of the population, but
make up twenty-eight percent of the children with
substantiated reports. 6 ' Neglect is the allegation
substantiated for most children in the dependency system.
In 1995, forty-two percent of the substantiated cases were
classified as neglect while only twenty-two percent were
the confirmed
classified as abuse. Sexual abuse was
161
allegation in eleven percent of the cases.
If a public agency worker confirms a report, often
referred to as "indicating" or "substantiating" the report,
the agency decides what further action is necessary. In
many cases, the perpetrator is removed from the home by
the time the investigation is completed, so no further
services or supervision is required. In other instances, the
family may be given the option of "voluntarily accepting
services" from the agency, services that are often delivered
by a private provider agency as a subcontractor to the
public agency. These services may range from parenting
classes and periodic visits to the home to out-of-home
placement of the child. By federal law, the agency must
make reasonable efforts to keep the family together, but if
services are not available to keep the child safely at home
despite reasonable efforts to provide such services, the child
may be removed. 62 Data compiled from thirty-five states
show that 130,685 children were removed due to abuse and
neglect

in

1995.63

As

of March,

1998,

there

are

approximately 520,000 children in out-of-home placements
as a result of removal due to allegations of abuse and
neglect."M
Once a child is removed to out-of-home placement, the
case must be reviewed periodically by the court or by
administrative review.' If the family refuses voluntary
services in the home or refuses to voluntarily place the
child, the public agency may petition the court to find that
422(5) (McKinney 1992).
160. See CHiD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA., supra note 71, at 19
(providing data from 39 states).
161. See id. at 30.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(C) and (D) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
163. See CHID WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supranote 71, at 38.
164. See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supranote 71, at 86.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(B) (Supp. 1998).
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the child is abused or neglected and to mandate a
disposition.166 The disposition can include services in the
child's home and/or out-of-home placement for the child.'67 A
system of procedural requirements comes into play to
provide periodic dependency hearings on the parent's
rehabilitation, the agency's efforts, and the child's safety."
The judge in such proceedings rarely considers the arguably
important issues of child support, joint custody, or domestic
violence 69 in formulating mandatory orders, but advocates
against domestic violence are increasingly encouraging
such considerations. 70 The ultimate protective tool of the
system is removal of the children from the home. In
extreme cases, this can lead to termination of parental
rights, an order that frees a child for adoption.
Private provider agencies participate by delivering both
voluntary and court ordered services to families. Unless
they are already involved in an ongoing way with a family
when new allegations arise, they do not usually participate
in the front end of a case. It is the public agency that
receives reports, investigates, and maintains records on
perpetrators and children. Private agencies enter at the
point of disposition and deliver the services that are agreed
upon or mandated. In larger cities, the public agency may
subcontract with over two hundred different private
agencies to provide foster care, counseling, a variety of
family supervisory functions, and a host of other services
targeted to improve parenting and to protect children.
States operate dependency systems directly or they
funnel state/federal reimbursement to state regulated
county-based systems. It is difficult to discern the number
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (Supp. 1998).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)(B)(C).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B).
169. While inquiries into violence against the mother in the home may be
part of a risk assessment at the outset of a case, the focus is on the children. If
the violence threatens the children, the children can be removed. A referral may
be given to the mother to tell her how to remove the perpetrator through the
domestic violence system and her swiftness and success in doing so may
determine how she is judged as a parent. She will also be given a variety of
tasks to work toward reunification with her child. Often, she is required to

maintain a stable home and income. This may make it difficult for her to
remove a batterer who is the family's source of income. See generally NATIONAL
CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 105.
170. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, A
MODEL CODE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994).
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of subcontracting private agencies from the central state
agency. In New York State, there are approximately 225
private foster care agencies. 7 ' In Pennsylvania, 209

approved agencies providing foster family care services

contract with the sixty-seven county agencies in the state.172
In Massachusetts, there are eighty-six separate private
agencies. 73 Florida estimates that there are seventy

licensed child-placing agencies that offer foster, group,
and/or shelter placements. Including those that offer only
adoption services, there are 104 licensed child-placing
agencies in Florida. 74 In some states, private providers

have come together to negotiate joint or collaborative
contracts with the public agencies."
The work of private non-profit provider agencies
predated the establishment of state-based child protection
systems and dependency systems. With the breadth of
federal and state mandates, the complexity of each
individual case and the growing volume of cases, the

modem dependency system could not function without
these private providers.
B. Court Participationby ProviderAgencies
Laws governing the operation of dependency
proceedings in the states often allow for participation by
private providers before the courts.'7 6 Without these laws,
private providers, as subcontracting agents of the public
171. Telephone Interview with Paul Gadre, New York State Dep't of Soc.
Services (May 8, 1998).
172. Letter from Robert L. Gioffre, Adoption Specialist, New York State
Office of Children, Youth and Families (Nov. 4, 1998) (on file with author).
173. Telephone Interview with Susan Bane, New York State Dep't of Soc.
Services (May 7, 1998).
174. Letter from Amy West, Senior Human Services Program Specialist,
Florida Dep't of Children and Families (Dec. 14, 1998) (on file with author).
175. See, e.g., Francis J. Ryan, A Consortium to Coordinate Public and
Voluntary Sectors Under Contract in Child Welfare, 59 CHILD WELFARE 607
(1980). Individual contracts with each private agency continue to be the norm.
176. Some states additionally allow for the participation of foster parents
who are agents of the private agencies. This paper deals only with the impact of
private provider agencies in dependency proceedings. For a discussion of foster
parent participation, see e.g., Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Teresa
Lazo-Miller, FosterParents, Children and Youth Services, and the Court: Can
Foster Children Escape the Bermuda Triangle?, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 181
(1996); Michael G. Walsh, Standing of Foster Parents to Seek Termination of
Rights of Foster Child's NaturalParents,21 A.L.R. 4th 535 (1981).
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child welfare agency would not have an independent role in
dependency proceedings." They would remain background
actors who deliver services to children in their homes or in
out-of-home placements, depending on the dispositional
plan for the child. By granting a voice to private providers
in the courts, the dependency proceeding changes from one
where the parent, child, and state are before the court to
one where an interested
additional stakeholder
participates. By allowing an additional participant in
determining the dispositional needs of a child, a unique and
important voice of the best interest of the child is heard by
the court.
States allow private agencies to participate at three
main junctures: dispositional reviews, termination, and
adoption hearings. Laws designed to encourage permanency
and move children toward adoption enhance any court
involvement for private agencies. If the laws instead
focused on keeping cases out of court, children at home, and
preservation services in the home, then private providers
would remain in the legal shadows, acting behind the
scenes as providers of those services. Termination and
adoption bring cases into court, and give private providers a
presence in the courtroom. In this way, the state laws bring
before the court direct information on the delivery of
services from the point of view of the provider of the service.
It is important to note that states usually allow private
provider participation at the dispositional and post
dispositional phase of the proceedings. It is less common
and more controversial, in light of the rights of parents, for
such agencies to participate at the adjudicatory stage where
the jurisdiction of the court and the right of the public
agency to intervene into the parent-child relationship is
first tried and established.'
When private provider
agencies are involved with families, it would help to have
them involved at the earliest possible hearings, in order to
177. This paper considers only the independent role of private providers
before the court in dependency proceedings. For a discussion of the independent
role of private providers in the context of a tort action for arising from the death
of a child in foster care see Cooper v. Montgomery County Office of Childrenand
Youth, 1993 WL 477084 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
178. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, 91

(1986) (rejecting assignment of attorneys for children until after the court has
authorized the intervention by the public agency as proper. Previously, they
argued that the parent, not the public agency or the child, should have a voice
in the child's care).

1444

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

provide necessary information to the courts. The private

providers should be active participants in all proceedings,
not only in post-adjudicatory hearings, although they would
be involved before the adjudicatory hearing only in those
cases where the families are under the supervision of public
agencies before petitions are heard at the adjudicatory
stage. In such instances, provider information from earlier
involvement with families is important and should be
before the courts.
Without private agency presence, the public child
welfare agencies would retain the responsibility of proving
or disproving the continuing need for services and the
manner of those services, using the providers to help with
the case if necessary. Giving direct access to the providers
allows a view of a child's best interest unfiltered by a public
agency's resource allocation concerns.
A few states by law make private providers full parties
once children are in placement." 9 Other laws require that
they receive notice of all dispositional review hearings18 °
and be allowed by the court to participate in the hearings.18'
A few states mandate a dispositional review report from the
private provider, as well as from the public agency. 8 ' All of
179. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-285 (1993); NEw YORK SOC. SERV. LAW § 392
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997-1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-282 (Michie 1988 &
Supp. 1995). Illinois law provides for notice and a right to be heard, but it
explicitly states that private providers are not parties. See 705 ILL. CoPlu. STAT.
405/1-5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). In New York, the court has discussed the
requirement that private provider agencies petition the court for foster care
reviews. See In re the Review of the Foster Care Status of Kim W., David P.,
Virginia A., 444 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (1981).
180. See Ariz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-515 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) ; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-701 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §
3816 (1997) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.701 (West 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
587-72 (Michie 1993) ; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.417 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1996); TEX. FAIM1.
CODE ANN. § 263.501 (West Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.38 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1996). For a discussion of the right to notice and participation without
party status, see, e.g., In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J57445, 691 P.2d 1116 (1984); In re Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No.
J-64016, 619 P.2d 1073 (1980); In re Amber Winkle, No. CA96-11-236, 1997 WL
14855 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
181. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 8-515 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 587-72 (1993); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.417 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.38 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
182. Eighteen-month review written report required in Arkansas, Nebraska;
dispositional report in Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas; report
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these laws allow participation by a fourth actor in the
system.'83 That actor, the private provider agency, is closer
to the delivery of services than the public agency in many
cases. A single private provider agency or a variety of
private providers working with a single family have access
to the parents, children, and information gleaned from
different clinical settings. The laws bring the private
providers in because they are in a position to inform courts

on the needs and welfare of the children, and to help move
the cases more swiftly to permanent disposition.
Many states allow private agencies to petition the
courts to terminate the rights of parents.TM This is the most
for review of placement in Minnesota, Virginia; six month review written by
foster parent(s) required in Kansas. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-285 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.720 (West
1996); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:24 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-657
(1995); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 263.502 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.071 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-282 (Michie 1988 &
Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1565 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
183. In fact, there can be more than one private provider before the court
and they can each take independent stands from the public agency with whom
they subcontract. A uniquely complex line-up of litigants was present in In re
DeborahS. In that case, the court explained:
The Catholic Home Bureau, the private agency which supervised
Deborah's foster-care by the Ruizes as well as the natural mother's
care of the child after her return from them and attempts to
rehabilitate the mother during both those periods, urges this Court to
direct resumed foster-care by the Ruizes. On the other hand, the City's
Commissioner of Social Services, who contracts with the private
agencies and distributes funds to them for foster-care, advocates
Deborah's continuance in her present foster-home [via Angel Guardian
Home] in the hope of another eventual return to the mother; the
natural mother joins in this position. Only the attorney assigned as
Law Guardian for the child, who has conscientiously represented her
since 1976, has entirely changed his position from that he then took in
favor of Deborah's return to the biological mother. Based on the
continued demonstration of the mother's fundamental incapacities, the
Law Guardian now argues that return to the Ruizes represents the
only hope of Deborah's securing the stable, nurturing care which she
urgently needs.
In re Deborah S., 419 N.Y.S.2d 803, 805 (1979).
184. ALA. CODE § 26-18-5 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (Michie 1996);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45A-715
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (However, in Connecticut, an Attorney General
opinion stymied efforts of a joint public-private agency collaboration to place
hard-to-place children for adoption. The opinion stated that the Attorney
General's office could not perform the legal work for the termination of parental
rights if the petition was filed by the private agency, as was called for in the
project plan. The opinion reasoned that this would be representation by the
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Agencies
final of the parenspatriae actions of the state. 5'
seeking termination of parental rights are often the same
agencies that are entrusted with providing reunification
services to families until parental rights are terminated. 8 '
The complexity of the private provider's role can result in
87
allegiances with any of the other parties before the court.
In Melissa M., the foster care agency opposed return of a
child to her natural father after she had been in foster care
for four and one half years.'88 The foster parents sought
visitation with the child after her return and at the hearing
Attorney General of a private agency. See Katherine Miller, Edith Fein, Gerrie
Bishop and Caroline Murray, Public-Private Collaboration and Permanency
Planning,April 1985 Soc. CAsEwORm J.CONTEMP. Soc. WORK 237. Legislation
ultimately remedied the problem.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1104 (1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.461 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-11 (Harrison 1991 &
Supp. 1997); IDAHO CODE § 16-2004 (1979 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 381581 (1993 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 625.050 (Michie 1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.231 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-105
(1994 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-18 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-4-29 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2512 (West
1991 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1568
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (1996 & Supp.
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-404 (1996 & Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
48.42 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT ANN. § 14-2-310 (Michie 1997). See
also MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-107 (West 1994) (making the agency holding
custody of the child a party plaintiff).
185. The concurring opinion in Wilhelm v. Spokane Community Mental
Health Ctr. discussed the unique nature of the termination petition in finding
that the parens patriae power of the state to file the petition could not be
delegated absent explicit legislative authority to do so. Wilhelm v. Spokane
Community Mental Health Ctr., 726 P.2d 479, 481 (1986). This delegation was
considered by the court in New Hope v. Ramquist. 765 P.2d 30 (1988). In that
case, the court found that the private agency had standing to file the
termination petition and that the New Hope concurrence was not binding. Id.
186. This dual role can result in the same private provider agency being
responsible for providing reunification services while seeking termination of
parental rights. In In re Derek W. Burns, the court found that such competing
interests were properly addressed on an individual case-by-case basis and that
"obvious contradiction in plans for termination and reunification by the same
agency" was appropriate in the case at hand. 519 A.2d 638, 643 n.5 (1986).
187. In In re Marilyn H., the foster parents who had cared for a child for
nearly twelve years petitioned the court for termination. The foster parents
were agents for a private provider agency that opposed the petition, along with
the respondent mother and the public child welfare agency. The guardian ad
litem appointed to represent the child joined with the foster parents in
advocating for the adoption, which was granted. The court stated that according
to the guardian ad litem, the child strongly desired her adoption. See In re
Marilyn H., 436 N.Y.S. 2d 814, 815 (1981).
188. In re Review of the Foster Status of Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300
(1979).
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considering the request for visitation, the foster parent,
foster care agency, and public agency all had separate
counsel.'89 The burden is on the public child welfare agency
to provide services, but it is often the private agency that is
actually delivering services and in frequent contact with the
family. When the private agency is allowed to petition for
termination, in effect it acts to release the public agency
from the responsibility of providing further reunification
services. The decision to allow and grant the petition for the
termination of parental rights is the most permanent
decision in the dependency system. Allowing the private
provider, not just the public agency, to make this petition
avoids resource conflicts for the public agency and helps to
insure that the petition is in the individual child's best
interest.
Some states' laws allow for private providers to
participate in court proceedings after the rights of parents
have been terminated. 9 ' This gives the courts access to the
service providers in an effort to keep children who are
legally without parents from languishing in foster care.
These laws have no effect on parental rights, because the
courts have already terminated those rights. At this late
stage of the proceedings, children's wishes are important as
to which placement they wish to make a permanent home,
but questions of reunification are no longer before the
courts. It is private providers who usually investigate
adoptive homes and prepare home studies for the courts.
The laws that include private providers in posttermination proceedings bring the private providers before
the courts and before other parties to a greater or lesser
extent, depending on the latitude of the statutory scheme.' 9 '
State attorneys general also play a role in auditing the
activities of nonprofit agencies, including private provider
agencies."' The additional accountability through active
participation in dependency proceedings adds protection for
189. See id.
190. See D.C. STAT. NEGLECT RULE 26 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1996); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.117 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1584
(1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-610 (1997); N.C. GEN. ANN. § 7A-657 (1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1574 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3A-412 (1996); WIS. STAT. § 48.43 (1987 & Supp. 1996).

191. Historically, private agencies were accountable only to donors and
boards of directors. See ABA GUIDEBOOK FOR DIREcToRS OF NON-PROFIT

CORPORATIONS 12-15 (George W. Overton, ed., 1993).
192. See id.
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those services that are mandated by law and then
subcontracted for performance by private providers.'93
Amidst concern that private agencies
were
overzealously seeking to receive purchase of service
contracts that might alter their independent mission, the
Council on Accreditation of Services to Families and
Children in 1997 included standards titled "Contractual
Relationships and Provider Alliances" for both public and
private agencies. The first standard for private agencies
requires that "contracts and formal alliances or networks
entered into by the organization [be] related to the
organization's purpose and congruent with the policies of
the governing body."94
Independent participation by private agencies protects
their autonomy. Private providers preceded the existence of
public child welfare agencies and they often provide
discrete services or access to an under-served community. 9 '
These important roles could be diminished if the private
agencies increasingly tailor their spectrum of services in
response to public contracts.
Private and private nonprofit agencies under contract with
government have consistently been shown to be more flexible,
more responsive, less "stigmatizing," and better able to satisfy
consumers of their services than have state agencies. The
preference for private provision of service has been attributed to a
number of factors, most of them not mutually exclusive: the higher
status of many private providers; a rationalization based on the
need to see services as effective; the smaller size of most private
service providers; lower expectations of small, funds-limited,
private agencies; the personal, idiosyncratic, or culturally specific
nature of some private providers; the sense of greater
confidentiality and safety (e.g., information gathered and services

193. For a iffler discussion of the accountability generally required in the
contracting process, see Margaret Gibelman, Theory, Practiceand Experience in
the Purchaseof Services, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES: POLCY AND

PRACTICE ISSUES, VOL. I, 1-46 (Margaret Gibelman & Harold W. Demone eds.,
(1998) [hereinafter Theory, Practice and Experience]. In earlier work, Gibelman
rethinks the position of social work education in light of the changes in public
agency services delivery. Given the increasing role of subcontracting agencies,
she argues that public administration or business management may be more
relevant. See Margaret Gibelman, Social Work Education and the Changing
Nature ofPublicAgency Practice,19 J. EDUC. FOR SOC. WORK 21 (1983).
194. 1997 Council on Accreditation Standards, cited in Theory, Practice and
Experience,supra note 193, at 25-26.
195. See supraPart II.
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provided by a private agency are less likely to instigate action by
protective service workers or a cutoff of benefits); the increased
sense of freedom to use or not use a privately provided service; and
the increased sense of empowerment and influence that recipients
experience in small, private organizations. 9 6

Autonomy of the private subcontracting agencies from
the public agency with which they contract is best
maintained when the private providers can independently
address the court in a voice separate from that of the public
agency. This autonomy, despite a subcontracting status, is
important to maintain the unique mission of private
providers:
IV. IMPACT OF AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR PRIVATE PROVIDERS
IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS-REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN

Because of their historic importance and their current
vitality, private provider agencies should be given a role
commensurate with their duties in dependency proceedings.
Having private providers fully and independently
represented before the court would have many implications
for the child welfare system. One effect would be on the
representation of children. Allowing private providers an
independent voice in the courtroom makes it less
problematic for a child advocate to represent the child's
wishes rather than the advocate's notion of the child's best
interest.
Part II described the early history of responses to child
abuse and neglect. There were no proceedings to address
196. John OLooney, Beyond Privatization and Service Integration:Organizational Models for Service Delivery, 1993 SOC. SERV. REV. 501, 502, 531 nn. 4
& 5 (citations omitted). This paper does not consider the economic forces that
weigh on the accountability and autonomy of private providers in the
dependency system. For a discussion about how competitive market forces favor
private provider agencies that most clearly match public agency demands, and
suppress their own autonomy, see Kristen Gronberg, Ted Chen, & Matthew
Stagner, Child Welfare Contracting: Market Forces and Leverage, 1995 Soc.
SERv. REV. 583 (1995). In the economic framework, loss of distinctive mission or
autonomy can be seen as an organizational cost of subcontracting. See Ralph
Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: Dream or Nightmare,
1994 Soc. SERv. REV 33, 35 (1994); see also Ralph Kramer, From Voluntarism to
Vendorism: An Organizational Perspective on Contracting, in SERVICES FOR
SALE: PURCHASING HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VOL. I, 97-111 (Harold W.
Demone & Margaret Gibelman eds., 1989).
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the disposition of the child; laws authorized colonial agents
to watch over communities of families and to move children
into apprenticeships if they were not being raised in
accordance with the norms of the community.19" Court
proceedings addressing abuse and neglect did not begin
until the mid-nineteenth century and those proceedings
were criminal in nature. They did not deal with the civil
custody or placement of the child. Even when private
philanthropic agencies began rescuing children from
abusive homes in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, custody and placement of children were not
addressed by the courts. With the development of a civil
child welfare bureaucracy in the 1960s and 1970s,
dependency proceedings with procedural safeguards,
including the appointment of a lawyer for the children,
became widespread. Even today, most children in the
dependency system are served in their homes by public and
private providers; their cases are not in court. Only those
cases involving substantiated allegations of abuse which
trigger court-mandated services or placement require court
involvement, including appointment of an advocate.
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ties
delivery of federal matching funds to the requirement that
a guardian ad liter be appointed for children in all
dependency court proceedings. 9 ' Regulations promulgated
to interpret this provision of CAPTA state that the
guardian ad liter must "represent and protect the rights
and best interests of the child."'99 The ambiguity in this
terminology has left open to interpretation whether
attorneys must be appointed to represent children or if
others in the community can take on this role."' Even when
an attorney is appointed, as is required in many states, the
role of that attorney in the proceedings is unclear. Must the
lawyer operate in a traditional lawyer-client relationship to
fully protect and exercise their child client's rights or can
197. See id.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix) (1994 & Supp. 1997). For a fuller
discussion of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, see supra notes
117-130 and accompanying text.
199. 45 C.F.R. sec. 1340.14(g) (1998).
200. For a discussion of the advantages of employing social workers and
others specifically trained to work with children, especially young children, see
Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the
Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FoRDHAI1 L. REV. 1955
(1996).
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the lawyer generally, or at least in some instances,
represent some notion of the child's best interest?"'

Scholarship and commentary on the appropriate model
of representation of children in dependency proceedings
assumes one of two positions." The first posits that
children should be treated as autonomous clients and their
positions should be zealously represented before the court.
This is called the "autonomy," "empowerment," or

"expressed interest," view. A second position advocates that
children, as not fully competent clients, need to be protected
and a position of their "best interest," whether or not it

coincides with their expressed interest, should be advanced

in dependency proceedings."'
Proponents of the autonomy or empowerment model
advocate that children should be carefully interviewed and

their attorneys should put their expressed interests before

the court. This view, prevalent in legal literature,"4 argues

201. This ambiguity exists in law and in practice. For a more detailed
discussion of the openness to interpretation of the advocates' role, see Emily
Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FOPDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1700 (1996); Donald N. Duquette &
Sarah Ramsey, Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases:
An EmpiricalLook at What ConstitutesEffective Representation,20 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 341; Sarah Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings:The Determination of Decision-MakingCapacity, 17 FAm. L.Q. 287
(1983).
202. There is general agreement that children in delinquency proceedings
should be represented as autonomous clients. This consensus flows from a
reading of In re Gault, which focuses on protection of a child's procedural due
process rights when a child's liberty is at stake. In dependency cases, where a
child's placement is at issue, the right to an attorney should be interpreted as in
In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In custody cases, the role of counsel is often
debated as it is in dependency proceedings. See Emily Buss, supranote 201, at
1700, n.3. Since this article is focusing on the impact of private providers in
dependency cases and their participation is rare in custody cases, arguments
made here do not translate into the private custody context.
203. See generally Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representationof Children, 64 FOPDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter
Conference Proceedings]. Articles in this special issue deal specifically with the
different models; see e.g., Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determiningthe
Role of Counselfor Children, 64 FORDHAm L. REV. 1399 (1996); Jean Koh Peters,
The Roles and Content of Best Interest in Client-Directed Lawyering for
Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1505 (1996);
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1655 (1996).
204. See generally Conference Proceedings, supra note 203; American Bar
Association Standards of Practice For Lawyers Who Represent Children in

1452

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

that a lawyer's professional role dictates such advocacy on
behalf of the client and that any other model which allows
for the opinion of the lawyer to dictate the proper position is
not legitimate. °5
There are many commentators who state their
preference for an autonomy-based model of representation
but import a variety of caveats. Some argue that a lawyer
should be excused from following her client's wishes when
the client is too young, the matter is too important, or the
proceeding is too chaotic to assure that all proper
information will be before the court.0 ' Usually these
concerns are most keen when the issue before the court is
whether a child should be returned to her parents. The
concern is that young, impressionable children will wish to
return to their parents against their own best interest.
Some commentators suggest that when these concerns are
present in a case, the child's attorney should take a position
that seeks to protect the lawyer's opinion about what is in
the child's "best interest."2 7 Others argue that the lawyer
should act as an investigator and objectively insure that all
information is in evidence before the court so that a judge
can properly decide what is in the child's best interest.208 At
least one commentator urges that lawyers for young
children
follow the dictates of the underlying substantive
20 9
law.
The first caveat, that capacity must be considered
before a child can be represented as an autonomous client,
is the most prevalent. It has led to a debate over the proper
age at which capacity can be presumed,210 who should
Abuse and Neglect Cases, CHILDREN'S RTs. CHRON., Vol. 14, No. 3, 1995-96, at

25.
205. See Katherine Hunt Federle, supranote 203.
206. See Sarah Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings:The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAIM. L.Q. 287
(1983).
207. See Peters, supra note 203; Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver:
Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 FORD. L. REV. 1473 (1996).
208. See Martin Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard:
Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984)
(discussing the various attorney roles, including the role of investigator).
209. See Guggenheim, supra note 203. Guggenheim advocates a traditional
lawyer-client relationship for unimpaired children in any legal context. For
impaired children, the underlying substantive law should inform the lawyer's
representation.
210. See Ramsey, supra note 206, at 312 (suggesting a presumptive age of
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determine capacity, 1 ' and the attempts a lawyer can make
to discern a sense of the child's wishes even when the child
is considered impaired. 12
The second caveat, that a child's lawyer can be excused
from the traditional lawyer role when the stakes are too
high for the child's safety, usually imagines a situation
where placement or reunification is before the court and the
child is urging a position which would place her with her
parents.1 3 This occurs at the dispositional or dispositional
review stage of proceedings, precisely when the private
provider can begin to play an active part in the court
process. The active participation of a private provider lends
a second voice, in addition to that of the public agency, to a
position opined to be in the child's best interest. It can also
bring before the court the agent that could keep a child at
home with additional safeguards. Children's lawyers should
advocate for an active role by private providers both to free
them to properly represent their child client's wishes and to
bring before the court all the relevant parties that can
protect the child's welfare.
The active participation of private provider agencies
also alleviates the third caveat. In the chaotic, crisis driven
dependency system, the concern is raised that the
adversarial system cannot be presumed to act properly.
Critics suggest that not all of the information will be
brought out by the overburdened child welfare agency, and
the child's position, if prepared in a thorough and
aggressive manner, will be given undue weight. Even if
both the parental representatives and the public agency
prepare fully, the child's attorney can be seen as a third
party whose decision lends determinative weight to the
position of one or the other party. This can be problematic
when the child's attorney follows her client's wishes instead
of her own opinion about what is in the child's best interest,
and the other parties do not fully develop the facts and
211. See Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children: Report of the Working Group on Determining the
Child's Capacity to Make Decisions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (1996).
212. See Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's
Competence in Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (1996).
213. See Ramsey, supra note 206, at 309-20 (suggesting that a
determination of capacity can be tied to the risk presented by the position: if the
risk is high, a higher degree of capacity can be required before the lawyer must
be bound by the client's position. Ramsey acknowledges the subjectivity
inherent in this position).
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present dangers which lead the attorney to reach that
opinion.
Participation by private providers can counter this
concern by creating an additional stakeholder in the
proceeding. As was noted in Part III, the private provider
does not merely take the position of the public agency. State
laws giving private agencies the authority to petition the
court and prepare reports for the court contemplate an
independent, knowledgeable voice. As the participant closer
to the delivery of services than the public agency, the
private agency is in a position to put valuable information
before the court. Many state laws mandate such a report.
Other commentators see the role of a child advocate,
even an appointed attorney, to be to represent a child's best
interest regardless of the child's expressed interest. 14 This
position finds the possible incompetency, underlying
substantive law, and nature of the proceedings to be
persuasive in releasing the lawyer from her traditional role
and taking a subjective "best interest" approach.
Arguments for a "best interest" approach are
diminished when the influential role played by private
providers is considered. When an actor in addition to the
public agency is charged with coming before the court to
plan for the child's best interest and is given authority to
plan for permanency, attorneys representing children can
more safely represent their child client's wishes zealously.
This is especially true whenever the wishes of the child are
opposed to the professional social work or mental health
opinions that argue for permanent removal. The social
worker or caseworker for the private agency is in a position
to critique the needs of the child and the capabilities of the
parents in a professional, daily, clinical manner. A guardian
ad litem is not in a position to duplicate this kind of
approach.
Private providers should have a role in an expanding
array of hearings, so that they may represent the best
interests of the child before the court. This is a positive
development both in protecting the needs of children and in
encouraging zealous advocacy by attorneys appointed to
represent children. First, by adding additional stakeholders
to the balance in the adversarial process, the child no
longer sits as the third, often decisive party whose position
214. See Peters, supra note 203 (discussing the best interest model).
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may be given undue weight if his attorney supports the
parent or public agency position. Second, the private
provider is often closer to the delivery of services than the
public agency and is free from concerns about public
resource allocation and other distractions which may
influence a public agency's position. Private agencies can
provide a useful perspective regarding the best interests of
the child. Third, the evidence presented by the private
agency can help the judge make an informed decision. The
independent participation of private providers should be
encouraged at dependency proceedings.
CONCLUSION

Private provider agencies have played a vital role in the
protection of abused and neglected children for over one
hundred years. The integral role played by a variety of
actors outside of the family, especially the role of private
provider agencies, challenges the myth that the parent,
and
rights
share
exclusively
and
state
child,
responsibilities. The role of foster parents, relatives, and
other non-traditional caretakers in raising children has
been acknowledged, but the role of private provider
agencies is one also worthy of legal recognition. By opening
the closed triangle of the parent-child-state framework to
include other caretakers, responsibility and resources for
children can be more clearly explored and understood.
Private providers are an integral part of this wider circle
and can provide valuable services and evidence to better
serve dependent children and their families.
The important, unique role played by private agencies
has largely been ignored in legal literature. Because the
literature assumes that private agencies are subcontracting
agencies of the public agencies, it does not consider the
independent impact that private providers have on the
traditional parent-child-state tripartite balance of rights or
on the representation of those rights before the court. Their
role in the dependency system affects the authority and
accountability of the public agency as well as their own
autonomy. It also has implications for the protection of
children's best interests and for the rights-based
representation of children in dependency cases. Because of
their central role in the dependency system both
historically and currently, private provider agencies should
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be given an active role in dependency proceedings after
children have been adjudicated. This public positioning of
the private agencies makes them more accountable to the
court and other parties and serves the best interests of
children by bringing directly into evidence the intimate
information the providers have on children and their
families.
Private providers are representatives of the community
beyond the "private" family. State-operated agencies, on the
other hand, are recent entrants in the dependency system,
consolidating the public authority that has long supported
the work of private agencies. Control of the design and
content of services to families by public agencies is neither
accurate nor desirable; other community voices are vital in
the exercise of protecting children. The public agency
should not be seen as an equal with parents and children in
determining the rights and responsibilities of family
members. By eliminating the imagery of the triangle, the
core autonomy of families is better visualized. Similarly, by
placing that family within a larger circle of the community,
the public agency is just one of the many actors in the
community that are involved in the protection of the child
and other family members. The private agency is a key
component of the community resources available to children
and their families, and the law should recognize its crucial
role in this circle of care.

